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1EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The aim of this report is to analyze the conditions under which Joint Implementation
(JI) can contribute to a cost-effective abatement of global greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions. JI refers to policies and measures implemented jointly by Parties to reduce
net GHG emissions contributing to meeting their national commitment under the
Climate Convention. The overall conclusion is that JI is a promising mechanism under
some circumstances. 
Difficulties related to implementation and control of JI projects vary considerably and
depend on what countries participate, how the project affects GHG emissions or sinks
(for example through fossil fuel saving or through carbon sequestration in forests), and
the institutional frames for JI. The simplest project type is fossil fuel saving between two
countries with legally-binding emission commitments under the Climate Convention.
The main results from the analysis can be summarized in three points:
1. The Conference of the Parties (COP) to the Climate Convention should take steps to
establish the institutional capacity necessary to initiate and coordinate a number of
studies and pilot projects in regard to JI. This may help all Parties to examine and
evaluate the possible benefits of JI and the question of how JI might best serve the
objectives of the Convention. The potential problems related to implementation and
control of the simplest JI project type are also found for the more complicated JI project
types. Thus extra effort should be put into solving these basic issues.
2. Contracts between JI parties should include incentives for the host country to
implement the project in an efficient manner. Contracts can reduce some of the
problems that may lead to a reduced cost saving potential and difficulties in controlling
the global GHG abatement effect of JI projects.
3. The establishment of a Clearinghouse or Credits Bank institution may significantly
reduce some of the potential problems related to implementation and control of JI
projects. These problems include asymmetric information and incentives that generate
inefficiencies, the difficulties involved in measuring the global abatement effect of a JI
project, and handling of risk related to uncertain cost per unit of GHG abatement.
      Annex I countries include 24 OECD countries (except Mexico) plus 12 countries from Central and1
Eastern Europe with 'economies in transition'. For a list of Annex I countries, see Annex 1 in this
report.
      IPCC (1992). 2
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1. INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) was signed by
more than 150 countries assembled at the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. The FCCC entered into force
in March 1994 after fifty countries had ratified the convention. The FCCC establishes a
global legal and institutional framework for how the Parties to the convention shall act
with regard to global warming caused by greenhouse gases (GHGs). Under the FCCC,
Annex I countries have agreed to adopt national policies and measures to mitigate
climate change and have recognized the importance of establishing a goal of returning
anthropogenic GHG emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000.  However, the FCCC1
presently establishes no legally binding commitments to reduce GHG emissions. Until
reduction targets are legally binding in terms of quantities and a time framework the
FCCC's role in curbing GHG emissions will be speculative and the incentives for
emissions reductions will continue to be weak and insufficient.
In 1992, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concluded that GHGs
(inter alia carbon dioxide, methane, chlorofluorocarbons and nitrous oxide) are
accumulating in the atmosphere due to human activities. The IPCC also concluded that
the global mean surface air temperature has increased by 0.3 to 0.6  C over the lasto
century.  Many expect that a global temperature rise, due to the anthropogenically-2
enhanced greenhouse effect, will take place due to the observed on-going increase in
the levels of GHG emissions.
Unless strong counteractive measures are introduced the expected emissions from the
OECD countries in the coming decades, see Table 1.1, will quickly outgrow the political
commitment to stabilizing GHG emissions made by this group of countries.
Furthermore, the expected global growth of CO  emissions -- 21.7 billion tons in 1990,2
25.1 billion tons in 2000, and 32 billion tons in 2010 -- makes the present commitments
under the FCCC seem highly inadequate.
This gloomy scenario underscores the importance of developing effective mechanisms
for GHG emission reductions under the FCCC.
      Art. 3.3.3
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Table 1.1 World CO  emissions (gigatonnes CO  per year)2 2
Group of countries/year       1990        2000         2010
OECD        10.4         11.8          13.4
Former Soviet Union (FSU)/ Central         4.8          3.9           4.6
and Eastern Europe (CEE)
Rest of the World (ROW)         6.5          9.4          14.0
            China         2.4          3.4           5.0
            East Asia         1.0          1.7           2.6
            South Asia         0.7          1.0           1.7
            Other         2.4          3.3           4.7
World       21.7         25.1          32.0a
Equal to 5.9 gigatonnes carbon per year GtC/yr.a
Source:  IEA (1994)
The cost of reducing the GHG emissions varies considerably across countries. Countries
in which electricity supply is mainly based on nuclear or hydro power have smaller
potential for reducing GHG emissions than countries in which electricity supply is
based on fossil fuels. The costs of emissions reductions thus vary considerably as some
countries might switch from coal to gas in power plants at a low cost, while others will
have to reduce, e.g., transport activities at a high cost. To require the same reduction in
all countries would therefore be unreasonable, because the cleanest country would have
to pay the highest price. Moreover, it would not be cost-effective, because the clean
country could reduce an equivalent amount of global emissions of GHGs in another
country at a lower cost.
All countries attempt to make the most out of their financial resources, a viewpoint
which also is endorsed by the FCCC.  Being a petroleum exporting country which meets3
all its domestic electricity demand with hydro power, it is not difficult to understand
why Norway introduced the concept of Joint Implementation (JI) into the negotiations
on the FCCC. JI aims at reducing the cost differences of GHG reductions among
countries by separating the commitment of each country party with regard to limitation
of net GHG emissions from the implementation of measures.
The basic argument behind JI is straight forward: The country that pays for abatement
abroad (investing country) yields a net benefit, while the country carrying out the
emission reduction (host country) gains from local environmental improvements and
reduced problems from global warming. In addition, the host country may benefit from
      World Commission on Environment and Development, (1987).4
      Art. 4.2 (a) reads: 'The developed country parties (...) commit themselves specifically as provided5
in the following (...) These parties may implement such policies and measures jointly with other
Parties and may assist other Parties in contributing to the achievement of the objective of the
Convention'. Furthermore, it reads that '(...) The Conference of the Parties, at its first session, shall also
take decisions regarding criteria for joint implementation (...)'.
      For a list of Annex II countries, see Annex 1 in this report.6
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the transferred technology at no cost. JI may thus reduce the costs of achieving a GHG
emissions reduction goal, but does not necessarily lead to lower global emissions. The
global emissions depend on the targets that countries set for themselves. However, by
reducing costs the obstacles for executing a global environmental policy become
smaller, which again may have implications for the goals. Hence, various aspects of JI
examined in this report might, if they are not addressed in an adequate way, reduce the
attraction of JI as an instrument for reducing global GHG emissions.  
By lowering the cost of curbing climate change at no expense for developing countries
JI may contribute to achieving sustainable development, as emphasized in 'Our Common
Future' by the World Commission on Environment and Development, commonly
known as the Brundtland report.  Although this report focuses on the costs of climate4
measures, it should be kept in mind that the reason why costs are considered is that one
expects a net benefit in terms of a better environment in the long run. The decision to
be made by states is a matter of balancing economic cost and environmental benefits.
A reduction of costs will enhance the net benefit of climate measures. However, no
attempts to weigh costs and benefits are made in this report.
The FCCC establishes a number of important principles to guide the Parties in
implementing the provisions and achieving the objectives of the framework convention.
It should be noted that the concept of JI is not defined precisely in the FCCC, and
criteria for JI projects are not defined either. It is nonetheless evident that the concept
of JI refers to activities through which one or more countries (the investing country)
contributes to reduction of GHG emissions by paying for a emissions-reducing or sink-
enhancing project in another country (the host country), and that this activity is credited
against legal commitments under the FCCC.
According to the convention, Art. 4.2,  the Annex I countries, the industrialized5
countries including those countries that are undergoing the process of transition to a
market economy, can pursue JI with other Parties to the Climate convention. These
countries might be categorized as follows:
- the Annex II countries (the OECD countries except Mexico),6
- the Annex I countries
- non-annex countries (developing countries).
Since the fall of 1993, the JI concept has been discussed at the meetings of the
      A phased development of JI is discussed in Vellinga and Heintz (1993).7
      Kåre Bryn, Head of the Norwegian Delegation to the INC, in CICERONE (1994), no. 3, pp. 1-2.8
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Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC), an interim meeting forum examining
and renegotiating issues of relevance to the FCCC. The first Conference of the Parties
(COP) will take place in Berlin in March-April 1995, and is expected to begin
deliberations on the issue of JI. Among the issues to be discussed are the definition of
JI, the conditions under which JI projects might be carried out, crediting of the investing
country for emissions abatement in the host country, and other relevant issues.
It seems likely that the FCCC will develop through the following four phases in the
future:7
- phase I, similar to the present situation, is one in which no countries have -
legally binding commitments,
- phase II is the phase where all Annex II countries have legally binding 
commitments,
- phase III is the phase in where all Annex I countries have legally binding
commitments, and
- phase IV is the phase where all countries have legally binding commitments.
It is not certain when the FCCC can be expected to develop from phase I to phase II, and
it is even more uncertain if, and when, the FCCC might develop from phase II to phases
III and IV. But phase II does not have to be very far into the future. At present, there is
broad support within the INC for initiating negotiations on a global warming protocol
specifying strengthened commitments at the first meeting of the COP. Should
negotiations on a global warming protocol be initiated in March-April 1995, it is not
unlikely that they might be completed in 1997 or 1998.  This report focuses on JI under8
phase II conditions.
Outline of the report
Chapter 2 discusses different institutional frameworks for JI projects. In chapter 3, some
possible motives behind climate policy are addressed from a welfare theoretical
perspective. In the main chapter 4, some analyses of JI contracts, incentive problems and
uncertainty are presented. In chapter 5, scientific knowledge of GHG sources and sinks
is assessed with regard to possibilities for monitoring of various JI project categories.
Chapter 6 presents a brief discussion of the incentives for private enterprises to
undertake JI investments. Chapter 7 discusses monitoring and control procedures and
a possible institutional framework for JI projects. Chapter 8 summarizes the main
findings of the report.
      Ramakrishna (1994), Wexler et al. (1994).9
      Hanisch et al. (1993), Mintzer (1994).10
      Confer the discussion in Hanisch (1991) and Hanisch et al. (1992).11
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2. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR JOINT IMPLEMENTATION
Before an international cooperative arrangement for JI can begin to function, the COP
will in all likelihood have to decide on a definition of JI. At present the objectives of and
criteria for JI projects may be variously combined. The objectives of JI and the FCCC
may not be identical and, in the case that they are not, the COP's definition of JI will
establish specific objectives of JI. Principal among the objectives that have been
discussed so far are identifying and initiating cost-effective opportunities for reducing
GHG emissions, supporting sustainable human and economic development, and
encouraging participation of private capital in JI projects.  The issue of encouraging9
participation of private enterprises in JI projects is touched on in chapter 6.
The JI project criteria that finally are agreed upon will determine when a country might
act as an investing or a host country, and in what way states, private enterprises,
international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) might
participate in JI projects. The final choice of such criteria will determine the strength of
the incentives to initiate JI projects and will accordingly determine how powerful JI will
be as an instrument for reducing global GHG emissions.
As pointed out in chapter 1, the FCCC is ambiguous with respect to defining JI, and
many possible arrangements to institutionalize JI have been proposed and considered
since the concept of JI appeared for the first time in the context of global warming and
climate change. Proposals have ranged from purely bilateral arrangements that involve
no international institution or organization to a global Credits Bank.  The advantages10
of establishing a market place for JI projects have also been examined.  It is assumed in
the discussion below that JI projects will be institutionalized within the FCCC.
However, the degree of institutionalization varies considerably.
The bilateral JI arrangement is one in which an investor and a host country agree on an
investment project. How project costs and GHG emissions abatement credits are shared
is left to the two countries to decide. The project is reported to the COP by the two
countries.
More complex bilateral arrangements are also possible. Proposals for a 'Clearinghouse'
are based on the perceived need for a 'market place' for JI projects.   The Clearinghouse11
collects information on potential JI projects and brings together investing and host
countries, serving as a mediator. Furthermore, the Clearinghouse may control the
information given on JI projects, especially with respect to the effect on GHG emissions.
A global Clearinghouse would most probably be institutionalized within the United
      Hanisch et al. (1993).12
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Nations system.
A more complex and ambitious version of a multilateral arrangement is the
establishment of a Credits Bank for investments in JI projects.  Investing countries12
could make deposits in the bank and receive credits for GHG emissions abatement.  The
bank will evaluate investment projects suggested by potential host countries, and the
bank decides in which projects it wants to participate. Based on a portfolio of
investment projects and their features with respect to costs and GHG emissions
abatement, the bank will calculate the average interest on the deposits, namely the
amount of credits due for each amount invested. By taking the average over the many
projects the risk in terms of uncertain emission abatement effect and credits given is
shared among investing nations.
Any of the above arrangements for JI projects will have to be institutionalized within
the broader international framework defined in the FCCC. At present, as pointed out
already, several ways of institutionalizing JI are possible within the FCCC. A broader
concept of JI includes a regime in which private enterprises, international organizations,
regional economic organizations, multilateral funding mechanisms and NGOs might
be involved in one or more project-relevant activity.
Regional and Global Regimes
The future JI regime should be designed so that it features the institutional options that
are considered most attractive. As mentioned already, different types of JI regimes are
possible under the FCCC. Regimes, either regional or global, and group-specific
commitments have recently been under consideration. A global JI regime based on
group-specific commitments may be most advantageous. When building a JI regime
within the FCCC, two groups of countries are essential, namely a group investing in JI
projects and a group of countries in which JI projects are carried out. Those two groups
obviously would reflect the distinction between countries acting as investing or host
countries.
Regional regimes regulate behavior and activity within a regional area. Membership is
usually restricted to those countries that belong to the region with which the regime is
concerned. Compared to global regimes, one significant advantage of regional regimes
is the relative homogeneity among its members. Members of a regional regime are
likely to be relatively alike in terms of level of economic development and therefore in
terms of willingness to pay for environmental protection. In the context of the FCCC,
groups reflecting regional configurations of countries that make group-specific
commitments to participating in JI projects represent a real opportunity for building a
JI regime. Furthermore, due to their common history a number of historical ties often
exist among countries in a region, and regional groups might benefit from already
existing institutions and organizations. Specifically, it might be advantageous that
arrangements for monitoring and verifying JI projects be embedded in regional
8governmental arrangements.
Because there is a large variation in GHG emission reductions costs between countries,
cost-effectiveness implies larger reductions in some countries than in others. In case
countries with relatively lower GHG emissions reduction costs do not become party to
any international arrangement to control GHG emissions, a significant potential for
cost-effective emission reductions or carbon sink enhancement will not be taken
advantage of globally. Countries with such potentials, such as Eastern Europe and
developing countries, are accordingly being considered as a group of countries in which
JI projects could be carried out. At the same time, the European Union (EU) and the
OECD countries are being considered as groups of countries which might invest in JI
projects. As Table 2 depicts, the OECD countries have also been considered as a group
in which JI projects might be carried out.
Table 2.1 The basic design of a global JI regime  
Group of countries/Role of Group of countries Group of countries in which
countries within a JI regime investing in JI projects JI projects are carried out
OECD x x
Former Soviet Union (FSU)/ x
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)
Rest of the World (ROW) x
A global JI regime, which would make it possible for JI projects financed by the OECD
countries to be implemented in the former Soviet Union, the Central and Eastern
Europe or the Rest of the World (ROW), holds the biggest potential for JI as an
instrument for global GHG emissions reduction. Before such a JI regime can take effect,
however, the FSU/CEE and ROW must willingly cooperate in implementing JI projects,
reducing GHG emissions, and the OECD countries must willingly invest in such
projects.
A global JI regime is one that is open to all those states that are willing to accept the
membership conditions of the regime. Within a global regime there will be a large
variation in GHG emissions reduction costs between countries; this makes a global
regime attractive to both investing and host countries, at least from a pure cost-
effectiveness perspective. In its most simple form, a global regime will determine JI
criteria that apply to all regime members and group-specific commitments will
accordingly be ruled out. But a global regime does not have to impose uniform
behavioral rules and standards on regime members. Within a global regime some
countries could be bound by one particular set of rules, while another group of
countries could be bound by a different set of rules. By establishing non-uniform rules
      Parikh (1994).13
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it might become possible for diverse groups of countries to become de facto and de jure
members of a global regime. In other words, a global JI regime could be based on
groups reflecting regional configurations of countries that make group-specific
commitments to participating in a JI regime. Furthermore, concern for political and
economic feasibility supports such a regime-building process. The distinction between
phases I, II, III, and IV, see chapter 1, implicitly recognizes that it should be expected
that a global regime of uniform rules and commitments will be preceded by a phase of
non-uniform rules and commitments.
The principal limitation of any global JI regime is the heterogeneity of members as well
as the high number of regime members. Everything else being equal, countries at
different levels of economic development are less alike in terms of resources available
for environmental protection and, therefore, are less alike also in terms of their
willingness to pay for environmental protection. This might also influence the
attractiveness and willingness to undertake JI projects. A second, somewhat different,
limitation of global regimes concerns the decision rules used by many global regimes.
Often global regimes use decision rules which are slow and cumbersome in practice.
But the combined effect of unevenness of concern for environmental protection,
unevenness with regard to ability to pay for environmental protection, and large
variation in GHG emissions reduction costs might make a global JI regime an attractive
option. Compared to less-than-global institutional arrangements, the divergence and
unevenness among countries are bigger within a global regime, a factor that makes the
global regime more attractive to investing countries that are willing and eager to finance
the most cost-effective JI projects available, and to host countries that are able to supply
the most cost-effective projects. Significantly, a global regime is therefore also to be
preferred from the perspective of getting the most possible GHG emissions reductions
for the invested resources. Briefly returning to the issue of the objectives of JI projects,
in addition to the attractiveness of cost-effectiveness, it is perhaps just as important that
a global regime creates an opportunity to assist the highest number of host countries in
becoming more energy efficient and ultimately in achieving a sustainable human and
economic development.13
A Pareto improvement implies that the available resources are reallocated such that the14
welfare for someone improves, but no-one's welfare declines.
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3. MOTIVES AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF JOINT IMPLEMENTATION
The argument in support of JI takes the minimization of cost for one country that
commits to an emission target as its point of departure. In a future, more mature regime
to combat global environmental problems, a system of tradeable permits could replace
JI. If all countries in the world set emission targets and JI is accepted (Phase IV) there
is no economic reason why tradeable permits should be rejected. Tradeable permits do
not require as much control from the third part as JIs, since emissions monitoring is
sufficient. Under such circumstances, tradeable permits are therefore preferable
compared to a JI regime. For the same reason, tradeable permits rather than JI are
advisable between countries with commitments, i.e. within a 'bubble' for GHG
emissions.
 JI can therefore be regarded as an intermediate arrangement in a world where some
countries commit to targets and some do not. The mixture of commitments with respect
to combatting global warming among countries raises the question of what the overall
global effect of such a regime may be. In other words, it is important to discuss how
robust the so-called 'win-win' argument is. Some developing countries and
non-governmental organizations are skeptical of  the arrangement and have raised
different arguments against JI. In this report, a number of these pros and cons will be
analyzed. However, it is important to emphasize that the different problems that are
discussed may relate to different frames under which JI may be initiated. In particular,
it is important to clarify a country's motivation for the implementation of a climate
policy before one discusses the problems.
If a country regards a reduction in its contribution to global warming as a gain of
welfare, more of the available resources can instead be utilized for consumption and
investment. In addition some of the released resources will be used for further
abatement since lower emissions will add to welfare. From this perspective, and
provided that JI does not have a negative net effect on the host country, JI typically
leads to a Pareto improvement.14
In a dynamic perspective the effect is more ambiguous. Within a simple economic
growth model the increase in investments triggers economic growth. If the emissions
are related directly to the production output, enhanced growth may counteract the
effect of more abatement. Under conventional economic assumptions the marginal
utility of consumption and emission reductions is decreasing, while the marginal cost
of abatement increases relative to the marginal productivity of capital. Under these
circumstances, the effect of an increasing stock of capital will gradually outrange the
effect of the increase in abatement efforts in the long run. This again results in an
11
increasing rate of growth in consumption. Thus, JI may lead to higher emissions
compared with domestic abatement without JI in the long run.
This conclusion rests critically, however, on the set of assumptions about the effect of
abatement and the macro production function. It is not evident that standard
assumptions based on static reasoning applies in the long run. One slight extension of
the analysis would be to include environmental feedback on economic activities by
means of a 'damage function'. If this function is progressively increasing with increased
emissions, the positive long-term effect on emissions mentioned above would be
moderated and maybe reversed.
It may, however, be unreasonable to put emissions into the welfare function to explain
the motivation for a climate policy. This assumes that governments in industrialized
countries really act as if increasing emissions reduce welfare, even if they know that the
ability to control the global problem by controlling their own emissions is negligible.
Another reason for caring about emissions is to give a signal about the willingness to
act, for instance as a response to international pressure. Then, the target is probably
better represented by an explicit (exogenous) limit to emissions, and the welfare
depends on consumption only. This implies that an indirect cost is imposed by the
explicit target which restricts the possibility to achieve maximum welfare. As opposed
to the previous model, therefore, a country could increase its level of welfare if it
managed to slacken the target. JI might open the possibility of doing so if a country
manages to attain more credits than it actually pays for. 
Compared to a case where emissions affect welfare directly, it is, however, easier to
predict the emissions of greenhouse gases when the targets are explicitly given. Future
emissions will be known if the target is given, and no one tries or manages to 'cheat'. In
the first case, future emissions depend on measures such as future marginal
productivity of capital, intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the second derivatives
of the emissions function and other aspects. These measures are very hard to assess.
Thus, to the international society, given targets may be more attractive than relying on
each country's worries about its own emissions. But there is clearly a dilemma here.
Explicit targets imply a limitation to a nation's ability to achieve maximum welfare over
time. Even if the commitment corresponds exactly to the optimal level of emissions, it
is most unlikely that the same target will be optimal after a couple of years with
economic growth, changing industrial structure and perhaps different possibilities of
engaging in JI projects.
A second difference between the welfare of emissions approach and the explicit target
approach relates to the international control mechanism. With explicit targets, there is
clearly a need for international control of the factual abatement of an initiative, since
both investor and host have incentives to exaggerate the effect of the abatement. In
particular, this highlights the problem of assessing the expected emissions provided that
no actions are taken. This is later referred to as the baseline assessment. If the welfare
of the investor, on the other hand, depends on the global emissions of greenhouse gases,
the countries will carry out the control themselves, and the importance of an
12
international control regime is radically limited: If the investor believes that the
investment is beneficial, the international control mechanism has few reasons to diverge
from the investors opinion.
These examples show that the issues discussed in this report do not add up to the sum
of problems to be met by a JI regime. Some problems occur under some circumstances,
others under other circumstances. The reason why they are raised here is that we can
not tell what the conditions for JI will be. One can not even take it for granted that JI
will be accepted as a means to achieve reductions in the worldwide emissions of GHGs
under FCCC. 
Because of the problems related to controls, JI initiatives will have to be limted to
projects with effects that are relatively easy to identify. Still, a number of problems
remain. The global effect of a project is difficult to assess because the assumptions
underlying the evaluation of the project may be violated as a consequence of the project
itself. In other words, the macro effect may be different from the effect estimated at the
micro level. At the micro level, the difficulties in predicting the effects start already
when the project is negotiated. The investor has to consider possible effects of
asymmetric information and design a contract that limits the possibility for the host to
get a better price than it deserves. Furthermore, the investor has to consider the
environmental effect of the initiative in the light of the expected cost, both of which are
uncertain. The next chapter provides an analysis of these problems and suggests how
to handle them.
13
4. ANALYSES OF JI CONTRACTS, INCENTIVE PROBLEMS AND UNCERTAINTY
4.1 Introduction
In order to make the mechanism of JI operational, a profusion of issues and potential
problems need to be considered and solved. The basic hypothesis of this report is that
JI is a recommendable mechanism under certain conditions, that is as long as certain
prerequisites for JI projects are satisfied. Referring to the FCCC, JI should contribute to
reducing global GHG emissions in a cost-effective manner. Thus the important question
is: Under what conditions will JI contribute to a cost-effective reduction of global GHG
emissions? 
Due to the number of issues and potential problems involved in JI, a realistic strategy
for the analysis is to focus on the fundamental issues facing all categories of JI projects,
even the 'simplest' project types. Subsequently, after finding ways to handle these
issues, one can take on more complicated JI project categories and additional problems
related to these. With this background the analyses in this report are founded on two
principles: 
i) divide JI projects into categories based on 'simplicity', and analyze the simplest
category first, and 
ii) focus on incentive contracts.
The guiding principle for categorizing JI projects is the size of 'transaction costs'. The
transaction costs for JI can, in general terms, be defined as the administrative costs for
all parties involved in the development, implementation, control and verification
process of a JI project. Furthermore, JI projects are organized according to the following
two dimensions:
1) The type of countries involved (Annex II countries, or Annex II countries and all
other countries),
2) Project types (fossil fuel saving, changing industrial technologies, carbon sink
enhancement, or changing agricultural practices).
Based on these dimensions, four main JI project types can be defined, confer Table 4.1.
Apart from project Type IV, which concerns a regime of tradeable GHG quotas, the
project types are organized according to increasing transaction costs; they are lowest
for Type I and highest for Type III. Type I is the simplest project type, whereas there are
significant baseline (which in general terms can be defined as the GHG emission time
path in the absence of any JI projects) and control problems for Types II and III. There
may be additional monitoring problems for Type III projects. Type III are mostly
forestation projects. Transaction costs and other characteristics of JI projects will be
 The reader is referred to e.g. Hart and Holmström (1987), Kreps (1990), and Eatwell,15
Milgate and Newman (1991) for surveys and some applications of incentive contracts.
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further analyzed in the following.
Type IV tradeable GHG quotas is a reference situation in which the transaction costs are
lower than for the other types. However, Type IV presupposes a regime which is
unlikely to be established in the near future. A more detailed specification of the project
types is given later in this section.
Table 4.1 JI project types classified according to rising transaction costs .a
JI project dimensions FCCC Parties GHGs abatement category
involved
Type I Annex II countries - Fossil fuel saving.
- Changing industrial technologies.
Type II All countries - Fossil fuel saving.
- Changing industrial technologies.
Type III All countries - Carbon sink enhancement.
- Changing agricultural practices.
Type IV All countries All categories
 Transaction costs are lowest for Type I and highest for Type III.a
According to principle ii) above this report focuses on incentive contracts. The
background for this principle is the existence of asymmetric information and incentives
for parties undertaking JI projects that may lead to inefficiencies, inter alia in terms of
uncertain national (and global) GHG abatement effects of the projects, and in terms of
reducing the cost saving potential of JI projects. These incentive problems would not
exist if all parties were only concerned with the global best in terms of reducing climate
change. However, a more realistic assumption is that most parties might exploit
asymmetric information for their own good (e.g. in terms of reducing their cost share
of the global climate measures), to some detriment of the global climate.  
Incentives are an essential part of economics, since individuals are assumed to prefer
leisure and require some compensation to exert an effort. A standard example from the
literature is an employee in a firm who requires wages to forego leisure and work for
the firm. The employees' work contract may serve as an incentive contract and induce
them to work. For example, the contract may state that payment depends on some
measurement of output.  Another example of incentive contracts is procurement15
contracting. For example, the government orders telecommunications equipment from
a private enterprise and is concerned that the equipment is produced at the lowest cost
 Baron and Besanko (1987) analyze asymmetric information, monitoring problems and risk16
sharing in procurement contracts.
 Confer the discussion in Bohm (1994a) and Barrett (1993b). 17
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while meeting the quality standard.  Some degree of asymmetric information between16
the parties of the contract is common, for example limited ability of the firm to control
the efforts of an employee. Therefore, the incentive contract must often be contingent
on some proxy for effort, such as number of hours worked, and there will be a
possibility for the employee to shirk. 
From this perspective, and since the report focuses on bilateral JI contracts, an
important issue is the potential of incentive contracts designed to reduce such incentive
problems. In a bilateral setting both the investor country and host country must accept
a JI contract and consequently find that the total benefits are larger than the costs. In this
perspective focus on incremental costs in the literature on JI seems less promising, also
due to all the methodological problems involved in making the concept operational.
The important issue in a bilateral setting is rather how to reduce the incentive problems
through JI criteria from the COP, through institutional arrangements, or through
formulation of incentive contracts for JI projects. In addition to bilateral contracts we
consider other institutional settings, such as Clearinghouse and Credits Bank, since
there are some significant differences in the incentive structure.
Closer specification of project types
In this section a closer description of the project types are given. Type I JI projects are
the simplest types of projects. Only Annex II countries are involved and the host
country must consequently be an OECD country (except Mexico). GHG emissions are
abated through fossil fuel saving, either through increasing energy efficiency or fuel
switching, or through changing industrial technologies. Several institutional settings are
possible in addition to a bilateral arrangement between an investing and a host country.
One option is for all the Annex II countries, or, more realistically, a group of OECD
countries (e.g. the European Union) to establish a system of tradeable GHG quotas
within the group and report their joint emission abatement to the COP. Then it will be
for the COP to approve the emission abatement of the group compared to a baseline
established for the same group of OECD countries. As long as such joint reporting of
emission abatement and tradeable quotas of a group of countries are accepted within
the criteria for JI projects, there is a definite advantage in terms of cost effectiveness.17
However, since an opening for such tradeable quota regimes within a JI framework is
unclear at present, and may be further into the future than a JI regime where Annex II
countries negotiate bilateral JI contracts, we will, in the following, focus on a bilateral
JI arrangement between two OECD countries. 
In general there are few incentive problems and relatively low transaction costs
associated with Type I projects. The problem of establishing a baseline is not a serious
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obstacle for this category of projects since baselines must be established by Annex II
countries and reported to the COP. Annex II countries are obliged to report their
emission targets and emissions to the COP. A country may then state that the projected
GHGs emission time path of the country is its official baseline. To serve as a baseline the
emission time path must be binding in the sense that it can only be modified under
particular (predetermined) circumstances. Otherwise there will be an incentive to
increase the baseline if the emission target turns out to be more expensive than
anticipated or planned. Credits from JI investments can then be subtracted from this
baseline and contribute to meeting the legally binding emission target of the OECD
countries. Another option is to start with the legally binding target (which must be
expressed as a emission time path) and subtract JI credits from this target. In such a case
JI projects may serve to make the target more ambitious. JI credits would then lead to
a national target of lower GHG emissions.
At the project level a simple JI project example would be fuel switching for an existing
power plant, e.g. substituting a gas-based technology for a coal-based technology in a
electricity-generating thermal power plant. If there is no change in the amount of
electricity produced, the GHG abated can be calculated as the difference between the
emissions from the coal and gas combusted by the power plant.
The transaction costs depend on the status of the Parties. Since the European Union is
a Party to the FCCC, countries within the European Union may undertake policies that
meet a GHG emissions target jointly, including the option to make JI investments in
other countries. Annex II countries that are single Parties to the FCCC (i.e. countries
outside of the European Union) cannot report their joint emissions target and policies
to meet the emission target unless their transactions are accepted by the COP through
an agreed procedure.
Type II projects have higher transaction costs than Type I projects because all Parties to
the FCCC can participate, even those countries that have not established a national
emission target. In this case defining the baseline is much more complicated than for
Type I projects since developing countries are not obliged to report national emission
targets to the COP. They are only obliged to report GHG emissions and inventory.
Annex II countries of the FCCC are, in addition to a GHG inventory, obliged to
communicate their GHG emission target, which can serve as the basis for a baseline (see
section 4.3 for further discussion of baselines). With respect to fossil fuel saving and
institutional setting, the situation for Type II projects is similar to Type I projects.
For Type III projects the countries involved and institutional setting are similar to Type
II projects, but the abatement mechanism is, instead, carbon sink enhancement or
changes in agricultural practices. The prevailing project categories are afforestation (i.e.
forestation of an area without previous forest) or reforestation (i.e. replanting of trees
in an area that has been logged) projects, in which the biomass of some area is increased
through carbon sequestration in trees, but sequestration in soil and other vegetation
than trees is also possible.
 Bohm (1994a) and Barrett (1993b) discuss and compare regimes of tradeable carbon quotas18
and JI.
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Type IV projects concern a situation where GHG quotas (in particular carbon quotas)
can be traded globally, and a supporting international regime has been established. This
is a reference situation since such a regime in theory can achieve cost effectiveness on
a global scale . Such a regime can serve as a useful reference situation. One important18
problem when establishing such a regime is to agree on the initial distribution of GHG
quotas, which to a large extent will determine the income distribution effects between
nations from such a global climate policy.
Issues and methodology
The analyses of potential problems concerning development, implementation and
control of each JI type in the later sections of this chapter are organized around seven
issues. These are listed in the first column of Table 4.2. The second column of the table
indicates the analysis framework applied, and the JI project types where the specific
issue is relevant are shown in the righthand column. Thus issues 1, 2 and 3 are the basic
ones in the sense that they are relevant for both Type I, II and III projects, whereas
issues 4, 5 and 6 are only relevant for Type II and III (and not Type I) projects. Finally,
issue 7 is only relevant for Type III projects.
Table 4.2 Issues relevant to operationalizing JI projects, framework for the analyses,
and relevant JI project types.
Issues Framework for the analyses Relevant JI project type
1. Incentives for investor and Incentive contracts Type I, II and III
host to overstate potential of
project
2. Asymmetric information and Principal-agency models with Type I, II and III
project selection hidden information and
hidden actions
3. Risk related to Nature's Model to evaluate alternative Type I, II and III
choice measures under uncertainty
4. Project selection under Analysis of uncertain project Type II and III 
uncertain transaction costs costs and no-regrets options
5. Risk of leakages Evaluation of bottom-up and Type II and III
top-down models
6. Political 'distortions' Incentive contracts Type II and III
7. Control problems for carbon Incentive contracts (to induce Type III
sink enhancement projects host country to choose
consistent national policies)
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The following section 4.2 discusses potential problems regarding incentives to overstate
the GHG abatement effect of a JI project when the parties to a JI contract report to the
COP (issue 1 in Table 4.2). Section 4.3 deals with some potential problems in host
countries related to 'political distortions' and definition of baseline (issues 6 and 7 in
Table 4.2). Political distortions refer to the risk of political decisions that may reduce the
national abatement effect of a JI project, and thereby also reduce the appropriate credits
for the investor. In section 4.4 the concept of leakage is discussed, and the importance
of the level of aggregation of the analysis for the risk of leakages examined (issue 5 in
Table 4.2). A general introduction to principal-agent models in section 4.5 is followed
by an application to bilateral JI contracts, with a focus on asymmetric information and
hidden action associated with JI projects between investor and host firms (issue 2 in
Table 4.2). This example and model type is both relevant at the micro level, i.e. between
firms, and at the macro level, i.e. between countries. In section 4.6 different uncertainty
profiles of JI project types are analyzed, with the aim of finding implications for the
selection of project types (issues 3 and 4 in Table 4.2). Finally, a summary of the results
from the analyses is presented in 4.7.
4.2 Incentives for investor and host to overstate the potential of JI projects
In a bilateral JI setting investing and host countries will prepare a JI project and report
the project and estimated GHG abatement effect to the COP, or some designated body
established by the COP. After a JI project is initiated, there will be a monitoring process
to determine its actual GHG abatement effect and a later report to the COP, as discussed
in Chapter 7. Incentive contracts based on after-the-fact control of the GHG abatement
effect may play an important role; they may reduce the incentive to overstate the
abatement potential of projects, as discussed in section 4.3.
Since the COP, or some designated body established by the COP, will have less project
background data than the participating countries, and since it will be impossible to
control all JI projects, both the investor and host will have incentives to overstate the
potential of the project. Asymmetric information and less-than-perfect ex post control
give both the investor and host an interest in exaggerating the GHG abatement effect
of the JI project. Investors can gain extra credits if they are not so concerned about
global GHG emissions abatement and the danger of climate change. The consequence
is lower abatement cost per unit and the host may play along to make the project appear
more attractive for the investor. Furthermore, some of the extra gain could be shared
between the investor and host. On the other hand the investor has an interest in keeping
the estimated GHG emission abatement effect of the project low in bilateral conract
negotiations with the host so as to get a better bargaining position and cut down the
price the host can charge (i.e. the cost of the project claimed by the host). On the part of
the investor such strategic behavior may partially counterbalance the incentive to
overstate the potential of the project to the COP. The COP could be able to take
advantage of these conflicting incentives for the investor, for instance through
inspection of the negotiations and the contract (which would require some additional
resources spent by the COP), or through specifying criteria for JI contracts that can
extract some additional information from the host, and thus reduce the information
 Confer the criteria proposed by the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee in INC19
(1994a) and the discussion in Jones (1993).
 Confer Hanisch et al. (1993) for a further discussion of Clearinghouse.20
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'gap' between the host (and investor) and the COP. However, the incentive to overstate
is not reduced for the host, which is likely to be the best informed part under this type
of asymmetric information. Thus there is still a danger that the realized GHG abatement
effect of the project is less than the anticipated one. This will make the process of
controlling and verifying the global abatement effect more complicated and uncertain.
In a situation of asymmetric information and incentive problems the crucial issue is how
to reduce such incentive problems. This may be achieved through special reporting
criteria which all JI project candidates must satisfy; established by the COP,  or through
institutional arrangements for the JI mechanism. Two possible institutional
arrangements are Clearinghouse and Credits Bank, confer chapter 2.
Reporting criteria
In a situation with strong incentives to overstate the abatement effect of a JI project, the
COP is left with the option of establishing reporting requirements which can be verified
by a third party.  One relevant type of criteria should demand strict documentation19
requirements for the GHG abatement effect of a JI project compared to a reasonable
baseline, confer Possible Criterion 6, in INC (1994a), and the discussion in chapter 6. The
further specification of such criteria will inter alia depend on the definition and control
of baselines.
Clearinghouse
When moving from bilateral arrangements to a Clearinghouse institutional setting one
important feature is the establishment of a 'market' for JI projects.  In this setting a20
potential host may still exaggerate the GHG abatement potential of a JI project in order
to make it appear more attractive to a potential host. However, the market should have
a moderating effect on the ability for hosts to exploit asymmetric information,
exaggerate the abatement effect or understate project costs because there are other
potential hosts that may lower their 'prices' (i.e. abatement unit cost) as long as there is
a net rent to gain. 
This reasoning is based on the workings of a perfect competitive market, where one
prerequisite is a homogenous good, i.e. that JI projects can be treated as a homogenous
good where the single interesting feature is the unit abatement cost. To the extent that
there are other features of JI projects that are important and which differ between
projects and that are not fully included in the calculations of the unit abatement cost,
such as different risk profiles with respect to emission abatement effect, the market
situation can be described as monopolistic competition. Under monopolistic
competition hosts have some monopoly power through offering a more or less 'unique'
good (i.e. a JI project) that can result in extra rent in the short run, but the extra rent can
 For a general discussion of leakages and baseline definitions the reader is referred to e.g.21
Barrett (1993a), Bohm (1994a) and (1994b), Kuik, Peters and Schrijver (1994), and Selrod and
Torvanger (1994). 
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disappear due to the entry of new hosts. Under perfect competition JI projects will be
offered at minimum costs, and thereby lead to efficiency. Under monopolistic
competition, however, JI projects are not offered at minimum cost, so there will be some
inefficiency and an additional cost involved in financing some specific abatement effect
compared to perfect competition.
 
The Credits Bank
In the case of the Credits Bank the overstating incentive problem is also likely to be
reduced. A unit abatement price will develop as an average return to JI projects
compared to costs, and consequently the JI project risk in terms of uncertain costs and
abatement effect is shared between the investors. In this setting a potential host may still
exploit asymmetric information and exaggerate the GHG abatement potential of a JI
project in order to make it more attractive for the Credits Bank, but there is less room
for an alliance with an investor compared to a bilateral setting. In addition, the
resources of the Credits Bank should mean improved capacity to participate in the
reporting to the COP and thus discourage exaggerations of the abatement potential. The
Credits Bank can arrange auctions, where potential hosts offer their JI projects at a price,
and the bank buys the cheapest projects (in terms of unit abatement cost) up to the
preferred total abatement effect. Furthermore, the Credits Bank may act as a
monopsonist (i.e. single buyer) of JI projects, in which case the 'market' power of the
Credits Bank makes it able to reduce the 'prices' charged by potential hosts. All these
possibilities imply relatively more 'market' power to the Credits Bank compared to the
hosts, and may, under some circumstances, reduce the ability for hosts to extract extra
rent due to asymmetric information.
4.3 'Political distortions', baseline problems, and the potential of incentive contracts
Some issues associated with planning and political decisions are more pronounced at
the national level than at the firm level. In Figure 4.1 the determinants of the net
national GHGs abatement effect of a JI project are shown in principal terms, where the
net national abatement effect is defined as baseline emissions subtracted from emissions
after realization of a JI project. Emissions after realization of a JI project can be higher
than anticipated due to leakages. Leakages can be defined as a lower-than-planned or
calculated GHGs emission abatement effect at the national or global level. In the
literature leakages are commonly discussed only in terms of market effects (e.g. effect
on relative prices and consumer reactions and changes in 'terms of trade'),  but this21
report also includes strategic behavior and political decisions as determinants of
leakages in Figure 4.1. In general terms the baseline may be affected by political
decisions and the possible existence of JI financing of no-regrets projects, which are
projects that are profitable under ordinary market conditions. In the following we
consider a baseline that is determined ex ante, that is before any JI activities are
Net national GHGs abatement effect
BaselineEmissions after realization
Leakages
Market Strategic Political
effects behavior decisions
of JI project
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undertaken. The baseline can only be modified later in particular circumstances.
However, the discussion of leakages concerns an ex post situation, where JI projects have
been or are being implemented.
This section deals with political decisions at the national level which may reduce the
abatement effect through leakages. A government in a host country may let its
planning, economic policy (e.g. politically motivated market interventions) and political
decisions be influenced by external funding and implementation of JI projects, or the
anticipation of such funding (cf. the discussion in section 4.2.2 on contracts between two
firms). Since JI projects will inter alia have local economic and labor market effects, and,
depending on the size of the project, may have some national effects, it can be rational
for the government to let its policies be influenced by such external funding. Such
influence is more likely the larger the total JI funding is. These effects will make the
calculation of the emission abatement more complicated and uncertain, in particular for
developing countries or countries with an economy in transition to a market economy
which does not have a national emission target as a foundation for a baseline. 
There is also room for strategic behavior by the host government in a game of baseline
calculations with investing countries or enterprises in that anticipated future external
JI funding may be influenced and increased. One example of this can be to exaggerate
project costs and 'turn' no-regrets projects into projects that need external funding to be
realized, thus earning extra profits. 
The potential of incentive contracts
Policy changes that affect the net abatement effect of JI projects are difficult to monitor
and control. By assumption these policy changes are a rational response to incentives
that make them profitable and are due to limited monitoring and control abilities by the
investor (and COP). In such a situation an important issue is the potential of incentive
 One option is to give the host country some share of the emission credits. Credits are22
interesting to Annex II host countries, but could also be of interest as 'political credits' to other
countries.
22
contracts to induce a host country to refrain from political decisions that reduce the net
national abatement effect of one or more JI projects. Incentive contracts can contain
bonus payments and/or fees,  and must be based on some after-the-fact (i.e. after22
realization of the JI project) verification possibilities. All JI projects need not meet an
after-the-fact verification process of the net GHG abatement effect, but at least some
fraction of the projects must be chosen for spot checks, see chapter 7. The final fee or
bonus payments might depend on the results of an after-the-fact report by the project
participants, but some projects should also be subject to a closer verification process.
Finally, the host must find that the expected benefit from a JI project, given the exposure
to the output risk of the project, is high enough to be willing to offer the project and
participate in it.
Some options for incentive contracts are:
1. A simple type of incentive contract could include contingencies on the success of the
JI project in the form of a bonus to be paid to the host upon after-the-fact control of the
abatement effect of the JI project. The host will receive the bonus if the project satisfies
the planned abatement effect; eventually one could accept some smaller deviation from
the plan.
2. A variant of a 'deposit-refund' system, in which the host presents the JI project and
pays a fee at the beginning of the project which is repaid if the after-the-fact control
process shows that the abatement effect coincides with the planned effect (cf.
Swierzbinski (1994)). Under such contracts the host has an incentive to have the project
controlled if it is successful. The incentive-correcting feature of the contract can be
adjusted through the initial fee, the amount paid back if the project is successful (which
may be higher or lower than the initial fee), or the probability of control.
3. A more demanding and politically less feasible solution would be to focus on the
additional baseline and control problems of non-Annex II countries and require that the
host country must establish a national emission target in order to participate in JI
contracts. This target could be stated in every JI contract. Alternatively, a statement on
this could be issued to the COP.
No such contracts can be expected to remove the initial incentive problem of 'political
distortions'. However, contracts might be able to reduce the problem. The feasibility of
all contracts depend on the after-the-fact monitoring and verification possibilities for
measuring the GHG abatement effect of a project at the national level. Furthermore,
some incentive contracts may be less acceptable to host countries (cf. option 3 above),
and there may be distribution effects between investor and host that limit their
potential.
 See Barrett (1994) for a survey.23
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A note on carbon sequestration projects
Let us now turn to carbon sequestration projects, which potentially have larger baseline,
control and verification problems than most other JI project categories. The main feature
of these projects is carbon sink enhancement, mainly in the form of afforestation or
reforestation. The monitoring and control problems of carbon sequestration projects are
similar to problems facing other project categories. But in some respects control might
be more complicated, for example long-term monitoring of forest areas, which can be
necessary to verify the long-term net sequestration of carbon. The carbon dioxide will
be released to the atmosphere if the forest is later logged or exposed to other human
interference that destroys the forest. A longer time horizon than for other JI project
categories may thus be required. With this background, carbon sequestration projects
are included in Type III together with projects intended to change agricultural practices.
The earlier mentioned incentive contracts should be applicable for Type III projects, but
some adjustments are necessary due to the mechanism now being carbon sequestration
instead of carbon abatement. The purpose of incentive contracts would in this case be
to induce the host country to avoid forest and national policies inconsistent with the
planned sequestration under the JI project, for instance making plans to increase
logging in other forest areas that may reduce the forest cover and long-term carbon
fixation in those areas.
4.4 Leakage and the level of aggregation
Leakage is usually discussed in relation to unilateral actions to mitigate climate change
and has two main explanations.  First, measures taken in cooperation within a number23
of countries may cause changes in the terms of trade between cooperating and non-
cooperating countries. A carbon tax on fossil fuels within a group of countries, for
instance, implies an increase in their costs relative to the costs in non-cooperating
countries. This improves the competitiveness of non-cooperating countries and makes
them produce more traded goods and increase emissions.  Second, a reduction in the
demand for fossil fuels following a carbon tax will lower the world market price for
fossil fuels and thereby stimulate demand in countries without carbon taxes.
In general, therefore, leakage means that the estimated effect on emissions of a given
climate measure may be different from what it turns out to be because of market effects
not considered when the effect on emissions was estimated. There are many indications
that these macro-effects tend to moderate the effect of climate measures. Therefore the
term 'leakage'. Its importance is, however, uncertain. The global reduction in the
emissions of CO  from a unilateral carbon tax within the OECD has been estimated to2
be between 94 percent (Oliveira-Martins, Burniaux and Martins(1992)) and 20 percent
(Pezzey (1992)) of the reduction in OECD. Strictly sppeaking, the problem is of a
methodological nature. It occurs because one cannot evaluate all kinds of possible
measures properly within the frames of global models.
 Håkonsen and Mathiesen (1993) make a comparison between a 'bottom-up' and a 'top-24
down' estimate of the costs of measures to reduce emissions of methane and nitrous oxide. They show
that measures with marginal net benefit in a 'bottom-up' approach may be highly beneficial in a 'top-
down'-context.
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The leakage problem is of particular relevance for the evaluation of JI initiatives, since
emission reductions from these initiatives will have to be documented to the COP in
order to be accepted as 'emission-credits'. Credits need to be estimated, and COP will
be concerned with the global effect of the initiative. However, it is most unlikely that
evaluations made by macroeconomic models can be used, partly because they are not
relevant for an evaluation of all possible measures, and partly because it will be difficult
to agree on a baseline. As a consequence, acceptable measures to be carried out through
JI will be rather restricted, probably to micro-oriented projects. Then, the baseline
problem may be avoided, but the leakage problem remains. Bohm (1994b) discusses
possible implications of this dilemma. He expresses a rather pessimistic view on the
potential of JI as a means to attain substantial reductions in global emissions of
greenhouse gases.
Measures under JI, therefore, will usually have to be evaluated 'project by project' by
so-called 'bottom-up' analysis. As pointed out by several economists such projects may
have macroeconomic effects of significance,  e.g., to the ranking of measures. Such24
effects are excluded in the 'bottom-up' approach, which has to be based on exogenous
prices. Fuel switching from coal for instance may cause excess capacity in coal mining
and thereby a reduction in the price of coal, which results in a higher demand for coal.
Such effects might be estimated for more general classes of topical projects and added
to the effects in the 'bottom-up' analysis. However, further methodological development
is required in order to merge micro and macro analysis. As for JI it means that one
would prefer projects with low or foreseeable leakage effects. This has to be considered
from case to case. The leakage of a fuel switch from coal to petroleum, for instance,
would depend on whether the country possessed coal mines or not.
It should be added in this context that 'leakages' of JI projects often will originate from
a stimulation of the economy in the country where the project is carried out. As Jones
(1994) points out, it is not clear how this is to be interpreted in relation to the FCCC. The
Convention emphasizes the need for a stimulation of the economy in developing
countries, because it may expedite the date at which these countries will be able to
impose a climate policy. Thus, the leakage may actually fulfill some of the intentions of
the Convention.
The possible terms of trade effects between investing countries and host countries have
been analyzed in Aaheim (1994a). Compared to a situation without JI, lower costs of
abatement will make committed countries able to increase consumption and
investments, which stimulates imports from host countries. To meet the increase in the
demand for export products, they will have to increase production which again
stimulates foreign trade. Therefore, investing countries will also meet increased demand
for their own traded goods. However, the restricted supply of resources will affect the
 Surveys of this literature can be found in, for example, Hart and Holmström (1987), Kreps25
(1990) and Rasmusen (1989).
 The term moral hazard refers to situations where agent act in their own interest, but to the26
detriment of others (i.e. the principal).
 Confer the classification of asymmetric information models in Rasmusen (1989).27
 Moreover a risk neutral agent requires no compensation to take on risk as long as the28
expected outcome is equal to the certain outcome.
25
price of traded goods. In what direction the terms of trade will move is an open
question. In general, the countries with the best ability to substitute between input
factors will end up as 'winners'. There are many indications that this applies for the
'rich' countries which initially imposed the target. To the 'poor' countries, an extra cost
may have to be imposed to account for the effect of the terms of trade.
Recall, finally, that JI may have an intertemporal leakage effect, as discussed in chapter
3. This effect occurs because lower abatement costs may stimulate economic growth and
in the long run increases emissions.
4.5 Principal-Agency models
4.5.1 Introduction
A branch of the incentive contract literature is the principal-agency literature.  In the25
standard example a firm can be the principal and one employee the agent. The situation
could be classified as moral hazard  with hidden action (i.e. the employee's effort is26
hidden for the principal).  This literature deals with how to design a compensation27
scheme that motivates the agent to act in the interest of the principal, given asymmetric
information that leads to unverifiable efforts. The contract cannot be made contingent
on efforts since efforts are unverifiable. Even if the output can be exactly measured, the
effort cannot be measured if output also depends on some variable that cannot be
observed (with certainty). Due to uncertainty and incomplete contracts agents do not
bear the full consequences of their actions. The agent may have some degree of risk
aversion, which is a common assumption in the literature. Risk aversion can be defined
as reluctance to accept risk, for instance measured as the extra compensation required
to accept a risky option of the same expected value as an option of certain value.  Thus28
a risk averse agent requires extra compensation, i.e. insurance, to accept risk in terms
of payment that depends on the uncertain output resulting from effort and some
variable that cannot be observed. On the other hand, the principal would prefer that the
agent bears the full consequences of the effort to give incentives to work hard (and exert
an optimal effort). Thus there will be a tradeoff between incentives and insurance, and
the incentive contract has to strike a balance between these considerations. 
Let us now relate the principal-agent literature to the analysis of JI contracts between
 Let us assume that the agent can exert a high effort or a low effort. If he exerts a high effort29
a high output is more likely then if he exerts low effort, and vice versa for the low output case. Since
the agent is risk neutral he requires no extra compensation to take on risk. To induce him to choose the
high effort it is then sufficient to offer him a bonus in the high output case that makes his expected
benefit higher if he exerts high effort rather than low effort.
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an investor and a host (where both the investor and host may be countries or firms). In
such a setting the investor and host negotiate a contract on a JI project, after which the
host exerts some effort to implement the project. Afterwards, the investor (and COP or
any designated body) is assumed to be able to observe the output of the project (i.e. the
GHG abatement effect), but, due to monitoring problems, the exact effort of the host
cannot be determined. The project output is uncertain since it depends both on effort
and some variable that cannot be directly observed, or that is excessively expensive to
monitor and verify. Thus it is not possible to let the payment to the hosts depend on
their efforts and there will be an incentive for the host to exert too low an effort, and
thereby gain an 'informational rent'. The informational rent increases the project cost
for the investor and makes cost minimization unobtainable. Consequently, the potential
cost saving of JI projects for the investor is reduced.
If the host is risk neutral it is possible for the investor to offer the host a choice of
different contracts in such a way that the host will prefer a contract that makes him
exert a high effort.  Through such an arrangement the host is induced to bear all the29
risk, which is optimal since the effect of the effort choice is internalizec. However, if the
host is risk averse, there will be a tradeoff between giving incentives to exert enough
effort and protecting him from too large a variation in compensation for the effort. Thus
the earlier result of a reduced potential cost saving for the investor is obtained.
Given a risk averse host and imperfect effort control possibilities the inefficiency in
terms of a non-minimized project cost can to some extent be reduced through
formulation of incentive contracts. Even if perfect control is not possible there is an
option to reward the host for outcomes that are relatively more likely if he exerts a high
effort, eventually in combination with some fee (or reduced bonus) if the outcome is less
likely if he had exerted a high effort. 
4.5.2 Asymmetric information and selection of projects
The problems discussed in this section are how informational constraints affect the
potential cost-savings of JI and the distribution of welfare between hosts and investors,
and how strategic behavior among the potential hosts could lead to an increase in global
emissions. 
The motivation for an investor to participate in the JI project is to receive abatement
credits less costly than through domestic measures. If the investor had complete
knowledge about the abatement achieved and the investment cost of different JI
      This study is based on Hagem (1994) where the design of JI contracts is studied in the30
framework of a model presented in Laffont and Tirole (1993).  
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options, the project with the lowest cost per unit abatement would have been
implemented first. However, due to incomplete information about the different JI
projects, the investor is not able to tell in advance the final impact on abatement of the
different JI options.
Consider a JI project where the investor finances less energy consuming technology. The
investment project implies that the host can produce the same quantity of goods with
less use of energy. The production function, which describes the technology, has
changed. However, complete information about the production function ex post of the
investment may not be available to the investor at the date of contracting with a host.
Some relevant information about the impact on the abatement or the cost of an
investment may be private information held by the host. The host may have more
accurate information about the impact on the production function of an investment.
Furthermore, the abatement achieved by an investment could also depend on the
actions taken by the host during the project period. For instance actions to maintain the
machinery and training of employees to operate new machinery could have a
significant impact on the abatement achieved by the investment. These actions could,
however, be difficult for the investor to observe. The investor could therefore face two
types of asymmetric information: The host has private information about the impact on
the production function of the JI investment and private information about its own
actions during the project period. 
Private information held by the host has an impact on the design of JI contracts. The
investor has two goals for a JI contract that will be in conflict under asymmetric
information. The investor wants the host to take the correct actions during the project
period. Furthermore, the investor seeks to minimize the cost of the project and hence
keep the financial transfer to the host at the minimum level necessary to persuade the
host to accept the contract. We will use a simple model to illustrate how these two goals
are in conflict.  We relate the analysis to the micro level, where an investor firm makes30
a contract with a host firm.  
The basic model
Consider an investor that wishes to enter into a JI contract with a firm in another
country. The investor can choose among different firms. These firms are equal prior to
the JI project but differ with respect to energy efficiency after the investment has taken
place. The use of energy is also affected by the firms different actions, henceforth
referred to by the generic term effort.
The use of fossil fuel ex post of the investment is assumed to be equal to the efficiency
parameter less the effort. The abatement (A) achieved by the investor is equal to the
$’( 0&$%H
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reduction in use of fossil fuels (measured in CO - units); 2 
where E  is the use of fossil fuels measured in CO  - units before the investment takes0 2
place, $ is the ex post energy efficiency parameter and e is effort exerted by the host
firm.
Assume that the efficiency parameter can take one of the two values {$ ,$ }, where $  <1 2 1
$ . A firm with $  is henceforth referred to as an efficient firm and the firm with $  is2 1 2
referred to as an inefficient firm. Before the investment takes place the firms have
private information about their ex post efficiency parameter. It is, however, assumed
that the value of the two different efficiency parameters is common knowledge, but the
investor is incapable of identifying which $ to attach to a specific firm ex ante.
A higher level of effort, e, will increase the abatement effect of the project. However,
effort incurs a disutility to the firm. Maintenance of the machinery and monitoring the
work done by the employees could be time consuming and costly for the firm.
Consequently, the host firm seeks to minimize the effort put into the project. To accept
to carry out the JI project the host firm has to be compensated by a net monetary
transfer T in addition to the reimbursement of the observable cost of the project. The
observable cost of the project is assumed to be equal to the investment cost less the
reduction in energy expenditure. The firm is willing to participate in the JI project if the
utility from participating is at least as large as the utility it can get if it turns down the
contract. We refer to this level of utility as the host firms' 'reservation utility.' The
reservation utility is normalized to zero. Let the utility of participating, U, be equal to
the financial transfer less the disutility of effort exerted. Hence the firm will only accept
the contract if 
where w(e) is the disutility of effort. The disutility of effort is assumed to increase with
effort at an increasing rate.  
The investor's benefit from the project is the value of the abatement credits less  the
observable cost of the project and the financial transfer to the firm. The value of the
abatement credits equals the cost of carrying out the abatement nationally. Each
investor chooses one host without knowing whether the firm is efficient or inefficient
and offers the firm a JI contract. It is assumed that it is beneficial for the investor to carry
out the project with both types. Equation (4.2) has to be satisfied for both type of firms.
The investor selects the JI contract that maximizes the expected benefit given the belief
about the probabilities of $  and $ .1 2
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General results
In order to discuss the impact of asymmetric information it is useful first to study the
characteristics of the JI contracts under complete information about the efficiency
parameter ($). The investor specifies the abatement required, A, and the financial
transfer, T, in the JI contract offered to the host. Let the abatement-transfer pair {A *,T *}1 1
characterize the JI contract designed for the efficient firm and the abatement-transfer
pair {A *,T *} characterize the JI contract designed for the inefficient firm. Due to the2 2
specification of the abatement function (4.1), the contracts designed for the two types
differ only on the specification of the level of abatement required. The contract offered
to an efficient firm specifies a higher abatement level than the contract offered to an
inefficient firm. The contracts ensure that the firm that carries out the project exerts the
first-best effort level, which in the model is identical for both firms. A first-best level of
effort ensures that the marginal disutility of effort for the host firm is equal to the
marginal benefit of effort for the investor. The first-best effort level is hereafter denoted
e*. The financial transfer specified in the two different contracts is identical. Since
financial transfers are costly for the investor, the firms are left with no rent, that is, U
= 0. The financial transfer covers exactly the firm's disutility of the effort exerted: T * =1
T * = w(e*). 2
Under asymmetric information the investor does not know whether the chosen host
firm is an efficient firm or an inefficient firm. It can be shown that under asymmetric
information, it is optimal to offer the chosen firm a menu of two contracts, one designed
for the efficient firm {A ,T } and one designed for the inefficient firm {A ,T }. The1 1 2 2
contracts differ from the contracts designed under complete information. The contract
designed for the efficient firm requires the same abatement as the contract designed
under complete information. Since A  = A * it follows from (4.1) that the efficient firm1 1
exerts the first-best effort level e*. The financial transfer, however, exceeds the disutility
of effort, T  > w(e*). Hence, private information held by the firm provides the firm with1
a positive rent. The contract designed for the inefficient firm requires lower abatement
than under complete information, or A < A *, which induces the inefficient firm to exert2 2
less effort than the first-best level e*. The financial transfer T  leaves the inefficient firm2
with no rent. 
The ability for the efficient firm to mimic the inefficient firm forces the investor to give
the efficient firm a positive rent. When the type of firm is unknown to the investor, the
efficient firm can always mimic the inefficient firm and choose the contract designed for
the latter. Note from (4.1) that e = A-E +$. From the fact that $  < $  an efficient firm0 1 2,
exerts less effort than an inefficient firm to obtain the same abatement level. Choosing
the contract designed for the inefficient firm therefore leaves the efficient firm with a
positive rent, since T  has to satisfy (4.2). The investor therefore has to give the efficient2
firm a positive rent larger than the rent it can receive by mimicking the inefficient firm
to make it beneficial for the firm to choose the contract designed for it. If the contract
designed for the efficient firm is the preferred contract it has to satisfy the following
71&Z($1%$1&( 0) $ 72&Z($2%$1&( 0)
      Aaheim (1994a) discusses conditions for abstaining from implementing no regret options in a31
more general context.
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condition:
The higher the abatement level required by the inefficient firm, the larger the rent that
must be given to the efficient firm in order to prevent it from choosing the contract
designed for inefficient firms. The investor could design a menu of two contracts which
induced both types of firm to exert the first-best level of effort. However, that contract
would result in a high rent for the efficient firm. To reduce the rent to the efficient firm
the investor lowers the effort level requested from the inefficient firm. 
The probability distribution has a crucial role in the determination of the optimal
contract. The efficient firm enjoys a higher rent when the investor's probability of the
efficient type is lower. The effort of the inefficient firm is lower when the probability of
the efficient type is higher.
No-regret options and strategic behavior
A main conclusion from asymmetric information is that the firm that carries out the JI
project may receive a positive rent. This section discusses the possible adverse effect on
global emissions of leaving positive rent to the firm. The possibility of being chosen as
a host for a JI project, and hence receiving a positive rent in the future, may reduce the
incentive to invest in less polluting technology today. Strategic behavior of the potential
host firm may therefore have an adverse effect on global emissions.  31
We will analyze the impact on global emissions of strategic behavior in a two-period
model. Consider a situation where firms in a country without a legally binding
emissions target know that there is a possibility of being chosen as a host for a JI project
in the future (the second period). Assume that there are two alternatives for investment.
The less costly investment alternative induces lower emission abatement than the most
costly investment alternative. The most costly investment alternative is preferred by the
investor, while the less costly investment is profitable for the efficient firm (a no-regrets
investment option). The potential host firm makes its investment decision in the first
period contingent on the expected JI contracts in the second period. If an efficient firm
invests in the no-regrets project in the first period, it will gain a profit from the
investment. However, it has revealed the private information about its efficiency
parameter to the investor. We will restrict the analyses to the situation where the
investors will choose a host among those firms that have not implemented the
investment in the first period. The reason for this assumption is that the investors
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receive abatement credits only for actual abatement, i.e. abatement in excess of no-
regrets abatement. The efficient firm knows in period one that if it invests in the no-
regrets project it loses the opportunity of earning a rent in period two. If the profit of
the no-regrets project in the first period exceeds the expected utility of refraining from
implementing the no-regret project, the firm invests in period one. The investment
decision for the efficient firm in period one will hence depend on the profit obtained
from the no-regret investment project in period one, the rent from the JI project in
period two, the discount factor, and the probability of being chosen as a host. The
probability of being chosen as a host is equal to the ratio of investors to potential host
firms.
If all of the efficient firms find it optimal to abstain from no-regrets investments in
period one, global emissions in that period will be higher than they would have been
in the absence of a JI regime. The global emissions increase equals the abatement
following from the no-regrets project multiplied by the number of efficient firms.
Another possible outcome is that some of the efficient firms invest in period one. To see
why this could be an outcome, consider a situation where the profit of the no-regret
option exceeds the expected utility of not implementing the projects. Some firms will
carry out the no-regrets investment. The more efficient firms that carry out the no-
regrets investment in period one, the smaller will be the number of potential hosts and
the lower the probability for the investor to pick an efficient firm in period two. The
expected utility of abstaining from no-regrets investment increases in the number of
efficient firm that carry out the no-regrets project for two reasons. First, the rent is a
decreasing function of the investor's probability of choosing an efficient firm. Secondly,
the number of investors compared to host firms has increased and therefore also the
probability for the efficient firm to be chosen as a host. This situation leads to two
different equilibrium outcomes. Either all efficient firms invest or some of the efficient
firms invest in the no-regret project. If the latter situation is the outcome, the number
of efficient firms investing will be  determined by the following condition for
equilibrium: the expected utility of abstaining from no-regrets projects equals the profit
of carrying out the no-regrets. The increase in global emissions is higher the smaller the
number of efficient potential host firms that carry out the no-regrets project.
Main effects of asymmetric information and implications for the design of criteria for JIs
According to the basic model presented above, asymmetric information causes an
inefficient allocation of abatement, which at a global level may imply reduced potential
cost saving from JI. First, because JI projects are not carried out exclusively by efficient
firms, the investor is not able to separate the efficient firm from the inefficient firm and
hence the less costly projects from the more costly projects. Second, if the host firm
chosen is an inefficient firm, the project is carried out with too low effort. 
Asymmetric information induces a reallocation of income from the investors to the
efficient hosts. Asymmetric information is hence beneficial for the hosts but costly for
the investors. An increase in the investors' expected cost of abatement could have an
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impact on the choice of abatement targets. Barrett (1993b) discusses the impact of
abatement cost on the choice of unilateral emission targets when countries act
strategically. He concludes that lower costs of achieving global abatement give parties
to the FCCC an incentive to undertake more abatement unilaterally than they otherwise
would. 
 
Asymmetric information is not just costly for the investor, but also generates
uncertainty related to the abatement cost per unit and the total abatement achieved by
the project. The uncertainty could be reduced by establishing a Credits Bank that
receives funds from the investors and implements several JI projects. By taking the
average over many projects the risk in terms of uncertain abatement effect is shared
among the investors. Furthermore, a single investor in the form of a Credits Bank could
reduce the informational rent and consequently incentives to abstain from no-regrets
investments (confer section 4.2).
A main conclusion from the model presented is that private information held by the
firms may be beneficial for the firms if they are chosen to be a host for a JI project. The
potential host firms may act strategically to take advantage of their private information.
One type of strategic behavior is to abstain from investing in less polluting technology
so as to avoid revealing their private information. Strategic behavior of the potential
host firm may therefore have an adverse effect on global emissions.
The increase in global emissions due to strategic behavior is dependent on the number
of potential hosts relative to investors. More potential hosts reduces each firm's
probability of being chosen as a host for a JI project in the future, and hence makes it
less profitable to abstain from investing in less polluting technology today. The more
countries that accept to be hosts, and hence the more potential host firms, the smaller
is the possible adverse effect on global emissions due to strategic behavior.
4.6 Evaluation of alternative measures under uncertainty
In this section we discuss how to adapt to uncertainty about the future cost of
alternative measures and point to some possibilities to reduce the uncertainty.
It is evident that climate measures in some developing countries can be carried out at
lower costs than the least cost of such measures in industrialized countries. However,
it is difficult to assess the exact amount to be paid for a given abatement project. Apart
from the difficulties in predicting the outcome of negotiations, there are uncertainties
that are the same to all Parties. These relate to the problem of predicting the future. To
be able to compare alternatives, it is vital that the uncertainty is explicitly taken into
account.
4.6.1 Classification of uncertainties by their impact on project evaluation
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An evaluation of the future cost of an emissions target requires information about the
amount of necessary investments, future operating costs, the factual amount of GHG
emissions abated by the different measures, and the necessary amount to abate in order
to attain the target. All of these components will usually be uncertain. The uncertainty
should therefore be made explicit for all of them in order to make a practical assessment
and comparison between alternatives. How the uncertainty should be expressed,
however, depends on its impact on the evaluation. Rather than attaching a probability
distribution to each of the uncertain components one has to identify factors that affect
fixed costs, factors that affect costs subject to continuous adjustment, and factors that
affect the necessary amount to abate, i.e. the baseline assumption.
Uncertain fixed costs
Fixed costs are costs that accrue for a given future period after they have been initiated.
The decision to initiate them is to some extent irreversible. The most typical is an
investment with no alternative applications. It has no second hand value and the
investor will therefore be stuck with the capital cost as long as the capital equipment
lasts ('sunk cost'). Operating costs are fixed costs if they are attached to an irreversible
decision, such as maintenance of capital equipment or the operation of a project that
cannot be stopped.
The uncertainty of fixed costs should be expressed in terms of the present valued cost
in different possible states. 'States' refers to conditions upon which the uncertain
variables, for instance price of oil, depend. Rather than basing the cost estimate on the
cost in the expected state, one should find the expected cost of all states, i.e. the
weighted average of all possible states. Figure 4.2 displays the difference between these
two concepts. Assume that it is uncertain whether or not the investment yields the
expected amount of abatement Ea. If it is successful the necessary abatement to achieve
the emission target is a . If the investment fails, the necessary amount to abate will bemin
a . Both possibilities have the same probability to occur. Thus, we find the expectedmax
abatement, Ea, in the middle of these two. The abatement cost curve C(a) is decreasing:
If the investment fails, one have to initiate additional measures in order to achieve the
given target. The marginal cost of additional abatement is increasing, which means that
the curve is convex. If the project turns out more effective than expected, one may gain
either because other measures may be relaxed or, in the context of JI, credits may be
'sold' to other countries. Because there is more to lose if the project fails than there is to
gain if it succeeds, the expected cost is higher than the cost of expected abatement.
Although uncertainty about the technical performance of the equipment requires 
quite different kinds of information, the method to use in order to take the uncertainty
into account is the same: Calculate the expected cost per unit of abatement as illustrated
in Figure 4.2. 
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Uncertain adjustment costs
Adjustment costs relate to measures that are flexible in the sense that the decision maker
may switch to an alternative at any time. An example would be a measure that requires
no investments, only operating costs. The uncertainty of such measures relates both to
the prices of intermediate inputs and to the effectiveness or quantity of the abatement.
Also in the case of adjustment costs, the uncertainties about price and quantity can be
treated similarly. Different from fixed costs, however, it is not relevant to measure
uncertainty in terms of the total amount of future (discounted) operating costs for a
given alternative. The uncertain variable should rather be expressed in terms of a
stochastic process. This means that the uncertainty relates to the change in the variable,
e.g. the price of input, from one point in time to another.
Stochastic processes are often intractable for analytical purposes. An exception is the so-
called Brownian motion, which can be represented by the expression
dq  = q (r dt + F dz)                        (4.4)t t
where q  is the stochastic variable representing a price or a quantity, r is its expected ratet
of change, dz is a random variable with normal distribution, and F is an expression for
the standard deviation. It is important to note that the history of the development of qt
does not affect the 'future' path. All historic information of relevance is embedded in the
 A procedure for merging stochastic processes with certainty equivalent aggregates is32
suggested in Johansen (1980).
 See e.g. Dixit and Pindyck (1993).33
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level of q  at t. The expression simply says that q is expected to increase by rate r per t,t
but it may deviate from this expected path, described by the stochastic term, q F dz.t
Uncertain baseline
For a country that commits itself to an emissions target, the necessary amount to abate
in some future year may be uncertain for reasons such as the level of future economic
activity, technological improvements and future composition of economic sectors. Since
the same source of uncertainty is attached to all kinds of future abatement costs, the
process related to the adjustment cost has to be expressed in terms of the uncertainty
of the 'state' variable, here equal to the fixed costs. This implies huge difficulties of a
technical character, which will not be dealt with in this report.  However, one problem32
related to this kind of uncertainty has been discussed frequently in relation to JI, the so-
called 'cream skimming problem' (Jones (1994)). Cream skimming means that rich
countries use up the low cost alternatives when they are alone on the scene, and that
poor countries have to pay more for abatement when they face targets some time in the
future. This problem will be dealt with briefly in section 4.6.3.
4.6.2 The value of a flexible strategy
Whether the uncertainties are related to fixed costs or adjustment costs have large
impacts on the evaluation of projects. The conventional cost-benefit criteria states that
the project with the highest net present value (or if the emission target is fixed, least net
present value of costs) should be chosen. To achieve an optimal solution by this criteria,
one has to assume either that the choice cannot be postponed, or that there is full
certainty about future operating costs and that operating costs are constant in the
future.  33
If it is possible to postpone the investment, and operating costs increase with full
certainty, a combination of the two alternatives may prove better than deciding at once.
Consider two extreme alternatives, one with only investment costs (fixed cost
alternative) and one with only operating costs (adjustment alternative). Let the cost of
the investment be 100 million USD and the present operating cost of the other
alternative 5 million USD. The operating cost is expected to increase by 1 percent
annually. Both alternatives are expected to last into infinity. The present value of the
operating cost alternative is 111 million USD if a 5.5 percent rate of return is required.
According to the cost benefit criteria, therefore, the recommendation is to invest.
However, the cost of the operating cost alternative is presently lower that the capital
cost of the investment at 5.5 million USD. With a 1 percent increase in the cost of the
 For further details, see Aaheim (1994b).34
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operating cost alternative, it will take approximately 9 years before it reaches 5.5
million. Thus, by postponing the investment one could reduce total costs, and the
minimum cost would be attained by postponing it about 9 years. The present value of
this strategy is about 98 million USD. This implies that, rather than the cost-benefit
criteria, a critical level for the operating cost would be a more appropriate criteria. In
this case, the critical level is equal to the required return on the investment. If the
operating cost is below, one should continue the operating cost alternative. If it is above,
one should invest.
If we introduce uncertainty and assume that the decision maker is risk neutral,  the
investment cost can be replaced by the expected investment cost. A seminal paper by
McDonald and Siegel (1986) shows, however, that when comparing the two
alternatives, a new aspect occurs: At a given t, we do not know whether the future
operating cost will increase more or less than expected. If at some time the operating
cost equals the required return on the investment cost there is a chance that the
operating cost will fall in the next period. Thus, if the criteria given under certainty is
followed, and the investment is made, one may regret this decision with a significant
probability. The investment is irreversible and its cost will accrue with certainty.
Therefore, it may be rational to wait and see how the operating costs develop.
The difference in flexibility between the operating cost alternative and the investment
alternative results in a higher critical value for the operating costs under uncertainty
than under certainty. It is possible to assess this critical value if the investment will last
into infinity and is regarded as sunk costs, and the operating costs follow the Brownian
motion commented on above.  Here, we briefly discuss some properties related to JI34
projects and extend the example given above.
Due to the rather strong assumptions underlying the analysis above, it may be hard do
find direct practical application of these results. However, some topical categories of
abatement measures can be regarded close to either the investment alternative or the
operating cost alternative. Especially since JI projects must be compared with potential
measures taken 'at home', one has to consider also general abatement measures as
alternatives.
 
Table 4.3 displays some categories of measures to mitigate climate change which may
be considered either as a fixed cost project or an adjustment program. In practice, all
projects will of course have some of both, but there is clearly a 'bulk' of costs in either
of them for the categories listed in the table, at least if we allow for a wide interpretation
of the term negligible. In category (5), fuel-switching, investments may of course be
significant. 
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      Table 4.3 Topical categories of abatement alternatives
Description Fixed costAbatement (a) Adjustment cost (q)
(A)
(1) Energy efficiency Lower emissions due Cost of Negligible
improvement to energy equipment
consumption
(2) Forestation Enhanced sinks from Cost of Negligible
programs trees planting
(3) Investment in hydro Emissions from the Difference in Negligible
or solar power plants alternative the
investment
costs
(4) Investment in Lower emission from Investment Negligible
infrastructure higher energy costs
efficiency
(5) Fuel switching, e.g. Difference in emission Negligible Price difference
from coal coefficients between fuel types
(6) General measures Macro effect on Negligible Macroeconomic cost 
emissions (e.g. reduction in
GDP)
However, the relevant investment cost would be the necessary amount of investments
required to make the switch possible. This implies that (5) applies as an adjustment
alternative mainly when replacement of old coal-based facilities is considered. Recall
that if the future operating costs of a fixed cost alternative can be considered as certain
and constant, they can be included in the investment cost and regarded as such. This
may apply for the operating costs of a forestation program.
The first four categories can be regarded as fixed cost alternatives while the two latter
consists of costs of adjusting to a given emission target. Except for (6), all categories may
apply both as an alternative to be carried out in the committed country and in the host
country. Apparently, however, most of the measures to be considered as potential JI
projects will probably fall into the fixed cost alternatives.
In some cases the assumption of an infinite time horizon for the fixed cost alternative
may be problematic. Strictly speaking, investments with infinite time horizon do not
exist, but for practical purposes it is sufficient to assume that the present value of the
abatement cost is negligible at the terminal period. Therefore, projects which aim to
enhance sinks by forestation (category 2) will normally have a time horizon limited to
the main growth period for the trees, and may not fit as an example after all. 
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To provide an illustration of the importance of these results, compare energy saving (1)
and fuel switching (5). Assume that a country considers investing in energy savings that
will lead to an annual reduction at 100,000 tons of CO . The cost of the investment is 1002
million USD. To abate a similar amount with fuel switching, one has to pay 50,000 USD
per 1,000 tons the first year (i.e. 5 million USD for 100,000 tons). This 'price' is expected
to increase by 1 percent per year, but there is a considerable uncertainty related to this
increase. Assume that historic data shows that it deviates annually by 5 percent from
its expected path. We set the alternative return on capital to 5.5 percent.
The example is similar to the one discussed above. When the uncertainty is taken into
account, however, the expected time of postponement increases substantially. The
critical cost for the fuel switching alternative increases from 55,000 USD to about 60,000
USD, implying a 'certainty equivalent' return on capital at 6 percent. The expected
switching time from fuel switching to energy saving is now 18 years. 
In practice, however, we do not know when this switch is going to take place. Figure
4.3 displays two examples of paths for q  that follows the same Brownian motion. Thet
two paths vary significantly. While the upper path reaches the critical q  -value after 10t
years, it takes 50 years before this level is reached in the second example. 
Figure 4.3 Switch time under alternative paths for qt
        Cost
                               Time
According to the optimal strategy, it would be correct to invest at t = 50 in the latter
case. Moreover, if one looked back at, e.g., t = 100, hindsight would perhaps result in
regrets for this decision, as the cost of the fuel-switching alternative reaches its peak
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exactly at this point in time. Compared with the cost-benefit criteria, however, which
resulted in a clear recommendation in favor of the investment, the optimal strategy is
now to postpone the investment for up to 50 years.
JI implies a significant increase of the range of possible measures to mitigate climate
change from those measures available in one country, thereby extending the ability to
follow flexible strategies. Financing fuel switching in other countries is one example of
topical projects for JI. Perhaps equally important, investments in JI will be less attractive
than a present value calculation of a project would indicate, if the committed country
has a flexible alternative available at home. A number of economic policy measures to
restrict emissions constitute such flexible alternatives.
 
4.6.3 The 'cream skimming' problem
JI implies that the least cost abatement alternatives on a world scale are initiated first.
Most of these low cost alternatives are expected to take place in poor countries. Thus,
when developing countries commit themselves to abate emissions of GHGs, they will
face higher costs than necessary today under JI. This is called the 'cream skimming'
problem.
This is a problem first only for countries without present commitments that anticipate
targets in the foreseeable future. This would be the situation for European countries in
transition toward market economy in phase III. Second, if these countries are certain
about how much to abate in the future and what the cost will be, they will be able to
account for a premium which compensates the future extra cost that accrues because the
'best' projects are not available anymore. Thirdly, new and attractive abatement
alternatives may occur in the future due to inter alia technical progress. In other words,
the cream skimming problem occurs as a consequence of uncertainty for a limited
number of countries.
However, the uncertainty about the future cost of abatement is substantial for the
countries that anticipate future targets. To get a picture of the importance of this
uncertainty, consider Figure 4.4 taken from Aaheim (1994a). The curve to the right
expresses the marginal cost of abatement from a given target in some future year. If the
emissions exceed this target, the country will need to introduce abatement at the cost
indicated by this curve. There is uncertainty about the level of future emissions. They
may be low (e ) or high (e ) with expected emissions (Ee) below the target.min max
The first uncertainty refers to the steepness of this curve, i.e. uncertainty about the
future abatement cost. JI adds to this uncertainty by the fact that every new project
accepted by this country before t represents a shift downward of the cost curve (e.g. to
the dotted curve). Since the curve is convex, the cost of the 'first abatement' increases
the more JI projects that has been accepted previous to this future year.
ec
Ec
Ee emax
Target
Marginal cost
Expected
abatement cost
of abatement
e
min
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The second uncertainty refers to the emissions. If the emissions turn out as expected
(Ee), there will be no need for abatement. However, the figure shows that this does not
mean that the expected cost (Ec) is zero because the expected cost is the average cost of
low emissions (e ) and high emissions (e ). The expected abatement cost curve refersmin max
to increasing expected emissions with equal distribution. Thus, as long as there is some
possibility that emissions may exceed the target, the target will have an expected cost.
These two factors may give rise to a substantial 'risk premium' in assessing a price for
a JI project.
4.6.4 Means to reduce uncertainty
In general, uncertainty implies extra costs and should be limited as much as possible.
The fact that continuation of projects with mainly operating costs should be prolonged
under uncertainty compared with certainty does not imply that uncertainty is attractive.
On the contrary, the expected present value of a strategy is of course higher the lower
the uncertainty is. Therefore, it is important to discuss whether JI may contribute to
reduce uncertainties about climate measures.
One way that has already been mentioned is that JI widens the available climate
measures, thus extending the possibilities for flexible strategies. To what extent remains
to be seen, however. According to Table 4.3 it seems that flexible alternatives mainly
will exist within countries that commit themselves to targets. This is not because flexible
alternatives are unavailable in, e.g., developing countries, but rather that the type of
measures that allow for flexible strategies, such as general economic measures, will not
be appropriate for JI. Fuel switching represents, however, one possible exception.
 Wilson (1984) provides a framework for a practical application of this result. 35
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A second possibility to reduce the impact of uncertainty through JI relates to a standard
result in economic theory, namely the importance of diversification. A country that
initiates a number of abatement measures with uncertain costs should aim at making
the uncertainty of its total portfolio of measures as small as possible.  Therefore, the35
uncertainty of a particular measure may be irrelevant for its evaluation if in constitutes
a part of a portfolio of measures. Then, it is the correlation between this particular
measure and all the other measures that counts. In other words, the uncertainty of a
given measure may be attractive if it counterbalances the uncertainty of other measures,
because it thereby reduces the total uncertainty of all the measures.
Introduction of JI may contribute to stabilizing the uncertainty of climate measures by
extending the availability of alternative measures. Moreover, attention to this aspect
may provide guidance to how an efficient JI regime should be designed, namely to
diversify all measures on a world scale in order to minimize the total uncertainty. From
this point of view, the perfect JI regime would be the establishment of a Credits Bank
that 'traded' abatement projects subject to JI. Other properties of such a bank are dealt
with in section 4.2 and chapter 7.
4.6.5 Project selection under uncertain transaction costs
In the process of planning, developing, implementing, monitoring and controlling JI
projects there are transaction costs (cf. Barrett (1993b)). Transaction costs can be defined
as the total administrative costs of undertaking the JI project, that is total project costs
subtracted economic expenses in strict terms, such as project investment costs and
operation and maintenance costs for some time horizon. In principle, transaction costs
should be included in the total JI project costs to find the abatement cost per unit of
emissions for the JI project, which is a main criteria for the acceptance of the project and
selection of the project in a portfolio of possible JI projects. Some degree of 'economics
of scale' is likely to exist for transaction costs associated with JI projects. Thus the
transaction cost share of total costs is probably larger for small-scale JI projects than
larger JI projects. This means a relatively disadvantage to small projects compared to
larger projects (cf. the discussion in Bohm (1994b)). In general transaction costs may
significantly reduce the number and types of interesting and acceptable JI projects. Due
to 'economics of scale' effects (i.e. information gathering, human skills, experience, etc.)
and smaller incentive problems in a Credits Bank setting, transaction costs may be
reduced and more potential JI projects be acceptable.
 Confer Selrod and Torvanger (1994) for further discussion of no-regrets options.36
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Transaction costs (and other project-related costs) cannot be known with certainty when
planning and developing JI projects. The abatement cost per unit might also be
uncertain due to baseline uncertainty and/or uncertain emission abatement effects from
a JI project. This type of uncertainty will have implications for the comparison of
projects with different profiles and the optimal choice between them. This situation is
illustrated in the diagram in Figure 4.5. In the figure the vertical axis represents
abatement cost per unit of emission, which is increasing upwards in the diagram. The
horizonal axis represents the accumulated size of JI projects in terms of anticipated
emission abatement, which is increasing to the right. The projects are ranked according
to increasing abatement cost per unit, and represented by the lower upward-sloping
line. The first part of the line, from O to N is below zero, which represents no-regrets
projects. These are projects that can be undertaken for a negative cost, meaning that
they are profitable under normal market conditions even if global climate benefits are
not included in the calculations.  Let us assume that an investor country has an upper36
abatement unit cost limit represented by C. Then the JI investor will be interested in
financing projects from N to B, since projects from O to N are profitable on their own
(i.e. no-regrets) and should be undertaken by the host without any external funding.
The project cost is zero in N and increases to the right to reach C for the last project. 
Now consider the situation where the abatement cost per unit, which includes
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transaction costs, is uncertain. This uncertainty is represented by a potential upwards
shift in the project curve. This is shown as the upper upwards-sloping line. Thus there
is some probability that the true cost curve is the upper one instead of the lower one,
which means higher abatement costs. The earlier no-regrets projects now turn out to
have a positive cost, and the investor would finance projects from O to A. The total cost
is higher and fewer investments undertaken.
When comparing the two situations and project cost lines we find that the optimal
project selection, where the cheapest projects are realized first, is particularly sensitive
to uncertainty of the cheapest and most attractive projects. If the cheapest projects are
no-regrets they should not be made applicable for credits under JI arrangements. On the
other hand there is some probability that they are not no-regrets projects, in which case
they could be the most attractive projects. The upper cost end for JI projects is also
sensitive to uncertain cost data, confer the change from B to A. However, since the
investor would prefer to start with the cheapest projects, the sensitivity of the lower cost
end would be more important for finding the least cost project portfolio. The analysis
of conditions under which projects are no-regrets or not would be of particular interest.
This uncertainty may lead to inefficiency due to a biased selection of projects since the
cheapest projects may be turned down out of concern that these projects are no-regrets.
Consequently investors may be left with only JI projects in the medium cost range being
attractive. However, in a Credits Bank setting the experience, human skills, and
information gathering capacity of such an institution could reduce the potential
inefficiencies related to transaction cost and abatement effect uncertainty.
4.7 Conclusions
The transaction costs involved in planning and implementing JI projects are smallest for
Type I JI projects, where only Annex II countries are involved, and GHG emissions are
abated through fossil fuel saving or changing industrial technologies. There are
additional problems and higher transaction costs if non-Annex II countries are involved
(Type II projects), or if carbon dioxide is sequestrated through forestation, or GHG
emissions reduced through changing agricultural practices (Type III projects). This is
an argument for developing JI criteria for Type I projects first, since some basic
problems must be solved to take on any type of JI project. Thus we recommend that JI
projects that are likely to contribute to solving these basic issues are given some priority
as pilot projects in the present FCCC phase I.
The incentives for parties to a JI contract to overstate the abatement effect to the COP
can be reduced through institutional arrangements like Clearinghouse or Credits Bank.
This is partly due to establishing some type of market that may reduce the importance
of asymmetric information, and partly due to the resources and know-how of such
institutions.
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Leakages can be caused by market effects, strategic behavior, or political decisions.
There is potential for incentive contracts between parties to a JI project that reduce the
risk of leakages based on after-the-fact control, such as a bonus to be paid to the host
country if the project is successful. The success in terms of national GHG abatement
effects will also depend on the host country's political decisions in the implementation
period. Due to the risk of leakages JI projects should be evaluated 'project-by-project'
(i.e. 'bottom-up'), if possible supplemented by macroeconomic effects based on model
analysis. 
Asymmetric information between parties to a JI contract can reduce the potential global
cost saving from JI, since the most cost-effective projects are not carried out first.
Furthermore, asymmetric information leads to inefficient implementation of some of
the chosen projects. Thus the cost per unit GHG abatement for the investor would not
be minimized. Furthermore, strategic behavior of the host could lead to uncertain
abatement outcomes for the investor (and at the global level). The risk of such effects
can be reduced through a Credits Bank institution, and shared among all investors.
Due to uncertainty related to future prices and other conditions there is an extra value
associated with a flexible GHG abatement strategy, i.e. to have the opportunity to regret
a measure that is taken. This may affect the ranking of different JI project categories.
Thus uncertainty can favor, e.g., fuel switching JI projects, since the operating cost of
these is relatively more important than the investment cost, as compared to, e.g., energy
efficiency improvement projects, where investment cost is relatively more important
than operating cost. It may also favor general domestic measures compared with
inflexible agreements with host countries. Uncertainty can be reduced through project
diversification, where the aim is to reduce the uncertainty of the total portfolio of JI
projects as much as possible. There is also uncertainty related to the size of transaction
costs and the existence of no-regrets projects. 'Economics of scale' related to transaction
costs can imply a relative disadvantage for small JI projects. If there is some risk that the
cheapest JI projects are no-regrets and do not qualify for credits based on after-the-fact
control, there may be a biased selection of projects where the most cost-effective projects
are not attractive to investors. Such inefficiencies could be reduced in a Credits Bank
regime, due to larger information gathering capacity and more know-how compared
to single investors.
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 'A change in average net radiation at the top of the troposphere (known as the tropopause),37
because of a change in either solar or infrared radiation, is defined (...) as a radiative forcing. A
radiative forcing perturbs the balance between incoming and outgoing radiation.  Over time, climate
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5. GREENHOUSE GASES AND PROJECT CATEGORIES
5.1 Introduction
The FCCC states in Article 3.3 that measures and policies to mitigate climate change
should cover all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of GHGs. Thus, as a point of
departure, all GHGs except those gases covered by the Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer should ideally be included in the JI mechanism. However,
the knowledge about the sources and sinks and the climatic impact varies with regard
to the different gases. Thus, the selection of gases that should be considered in JI
projects needs careful attention.
5.2 Geographical location of emissions
The globally most important GHGs for the direct radiative forcing of climate is carbon
dioxide (CO ), methane (CH ), nitrous oxide (N O) and halocarbons (mainly2 4 2
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)). Figure 5.1 shows the radiative forcing  from the changes37
responds to the perturbation to reestablish the radiative balance.  A positive radiative forcing tends,
on average, to warm the surface; a negative radiative forcing, on average, tends to cool the surface'
(IPCC (1994)).
 In IPCC (1994) the pre-industrial period is defined as earlier than 1750. 38
 Isaksen et al. (1992a), IPCC (1992), Lelieveld and Crutzen (1992), Hauglustaine et al. (1994a),39
Fuglestvedt et al. (1994ab).
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in these gases since pre-industrial times.  These gases have atmospheric lifetimes that38
allow the gases to be well mixed in the atmosphere, and their climatic impacts are
therefore not dependent on the geographical location of emissions. The climatic effect
of measures to reduce emissions or increase the strength of the sinks will also be
independent of location. With this background joint efforts and cooperation on the
implementation of measures between countries should be considered.
5.3 Climate impact mechanisms of gases 
There are large variations in the scientific knowledge about the climate impacts of the
various gases emitted to the atmosphere (hereafter named source gases). Several gases
have, in addition to their direct radiative effect on climate, also indirect effects on
climate through chemical and physical interactions in the atmosphere.  The source39
gases that affect the radiative balance of the Earth/atmosphere and thereby climate,
may thus be divided into three groups:
i) GHGs that have a direct effect on climate due to their radiative properties. Source
gases such as carbon dioxide (CO ) and perfluoromethane (CF ) belong to this group2 4
(see discussion about the gases and their sources in section 5.5).
ii) Gases which have no or negligible direct greenhouse effect, but which indirectly
affect climate through impacting on chemical and physical processes in the atmosphere.
Greenhouse gases (GHGs) and compounds interacting with solar radiation may thus
be affected. Nitrogen oxides (NOx), carbon monoxide (CO) and non-methane
hydrocarbons (NMHC) are examples of such source gases. 
iii) Source gases that possess the ability to affect climate both directly and indirectly.
Methane (CH ), chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and hydrochloro-fluorocarbons (HCFCs)4
belong to this third group. 
The climate gases that will be affected by the indirect GHGs through atmospheric
chemistry are mainly ozone (O ) and methane (CH ), but HCFCs and3 4
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) will also be affected. Indirect effects are recognized as
potentially important, but for several gases the scientific knowledge is still
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unsatisfactory.  Extensive research is going on to reduce the uncertainties with regard40
to our understanding of indirect effects.
5.4 Global Warming Potentials 
The Global Warming Potential (GWP) index was introduced as a tool for policymakers
to compare the potential of the various well-mixed source gases to affect climate. It is
a relative measure since it expresses the climate effect compared to the effect of a
reference gas. It is derived from the globally-averaged net radiative fluxes at the
tropopause. Thus, it is a global measure that describes the effects on the whole surface-
troposphere system. It expresses the cumulative warming effects of the gases over a
chosen time horizon. In IPCC (1990) this was defined as the time integrated
commitment to climate forcing from the instantaneous release of 1 kg of a trace gas
expressed relative to that from 1 kg of CO :2
where a  is the instantaneous radiative forcing due to a unit increase in the concentrationi
of the GHG i, c  is the concentration at time t, and n is the time horizon. Thei
corresponding values for the reference gas CO  are given in the denominator.2
The INC recommends that all relevant gases in the context of climate change should be
included in measures to mitigate climate change. INC also recommends that the climatic
effect of the various source gases relative to CO  given as GWPs should be used in2
estimates of contribution to the enhanced greenhouse effect from the individual source
gases. But due to the nature of the atmospheric effects, and insufficient knowledge of
such effects, the GWP concept cannot be used for all sources gases that enhance the
greenhouse effect.
The atmospheric lifetimes of the various GHGs considered in IPCC (1994) vary from
about 1/2 year to 50 000 years. The GWP values will therefore depend on which time
horizon that is chosen. The GWPs are often given for the horizons 20, 50, 100, 200 and
500 years. When GWPs are used in order to compare emissions on a common scale,
attention should therefore be given to the choice of horizon, and whether several
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horizons should be used. If only one time horizon will be used, a horizon of 100 years
should be chosen in accordance with the recommendation of INC (1994b).
INC also recommends that both emissions and uptake of gases should be incorporated
into the greenhouse inventories for the countries. Increased capacity of the sinks is only
possible for CO . Absorption of CO  from the atmosphere will increase as long as the2 2
biomass stock is increasing.
5.5 Choice of gases
Many gases can potentially be reduced through JI projects. Based on the status of the
current knowledge it seems prudent to include the following gases in JI projects:
* Carbon dioxide (CO )2
* Methane (CH )4
* Nitrous oxide (N O)2
* Perfluorocarbons (PFCs)
* Sulphur hexafluoride (SF )6
* Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs)
5.5.1 Carbon dioxide
Carbon dioxide is the most important gas for the anthropogenic enhancement of the
greenhouse effect. The dominating anthropogenic source is combustion of fossil fuels
(coal, oil and gas), and the CO  emissions can be estimated from statistics on fossil fuel2
production and use, together with information on the carbon content. Deforestation and
changes in land use also make significant contributions to the increased levels of
atmospheric CO , but significant uncertainties are related to the numbers for the net2
emissions from these sources. Table 5.1 gives the most recent emissions and uptake
numbers published by the IPCC (1994).
The table shows that the emissions from production and use of fossil fuels, and cement
production, (a), together with net emissions from changes in tropical land use, (b), adds
7.1 ± 1.1 gigatons carbon per year (GtC/yr) to the atmosphere as CO . Of this amount,2
3.2 ± 0.2 GtC remains in the atmosphere, (d), while uptake in the ocean, (e), re-growth
of forests in the Northern Hemisphere, (f), and other terrestrial sinks, (g), remove the
remaining part of the annual anthropogenic input of CO  to the atmosphere.2
 i.e. Isaksen and Hov (1987), Isaksen (1988), Berntsen et al. (1992), Lelieveld and Crutzen41
(1992), Fuglestvedt et al. (1994b), Hauglustaine et al. (1994b).
 IPCC (1992), Lelieveld and Crutzen (1992), Fuglestvedt et al. (1994b), Hauglustaine et al.42
(1994b).
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Table 5.1 Annual average anthropogenic carbon budget for the period 1980-1989
(IPCC (1994)).
CO  sources GtC/yr 2 a
(a) Emissions from fossil fuel and cement production 5.5 ± 0.5
(b) Net emissions from changes in tropical land use 1.6 ± 1.0
(c) Total anthropogenic emissions (a + b) 7.1 ± 1.1
Partitioning among reservoirs:
(d) Storage in the atmosphere 3.2 ± 0.2
(e) Ocean uptake 2.0 ± 0.8
(f) Uptake by Northern Hemisphere forest regrowth 0.5 ± 0.5
(g) Additional terrestrial sinks (CO  fertilization, nitrogen                     1.4 ± 1.52
fertilization, climatic effects) {(a + b) - (d + e + f)}
The numbers are given in gigatonnes of carbon per year (1 GtC = 3.7 Gt CO ).a 2
5.5.2 Methane
Next to CO , methane is probably the most important gas for the anthropogenic2
enhancement of the greenhouse effect. Methane is emitted to the atmosphere from both
natural and anthropogenic sources. In IPCC (1994) the anthropogenic fraction of the
total sources is estimated to be 60-80%. The most important natural source is wetlands,
while the dominating anthropogenic sources are production and use of fossil fuels, rice
paddies and enteric fermentation mainly in cattle, sheep and buffalo. Production and
use of fossil fuels is estimated to contribute about 20% of the total emissions. Other
significant anthropogenic sources are landfills, biomass burning, animal waste and
domestic sewage. 
In addition to the direct radiative effect of methane on climate, several indirect effects
through atmospheric chemistry interactions are related to emissions of this gas.
Numerous studies have focused on these effects and the studies give results that are in
good agreement.  The climatic implications of these indirect effects are therefore41
considered to be relatively well known. In the 1994 report from IPCC Working Group
I, methane is the only gas for which the indirect effects are included in the GWP
estimates. The indirect effects are comparable in magnitude to the direct effect.  The42
 Isaksen et al. (1992b).43
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scientific knowledge about the effects of emissions of this gas is considered sufficient
to permit inclusion of this gas in the greenhouse gas accounting needed in JI projects.
5.5.3 Nitrous oxide
There are large uncertainties connected to the emissions estimates for N O. The2
emissions are probably distributed among several small sources and it is difficult to
quantify their contribution. According to IPCC (1994) the natural sources are larger than
the anthropogenic. Important natural sources of N O are oceans and tropical forest soils,2
while cultivated soils are probably the most important anthropogenic source. Other
contributing sources are industrial processes, biomass burning, degassing of ground
water used for irrigation and cattle and feed lots.
The effect of increased levels of N O on the radiative forcing of climate is small but2
significant. In addition to its direct climate impact, N O also reduces the levels of2
stratospheric ozone, thereby indirectly affecting climate. In the IPCC assessments,
however, this indirect effect is not included among the mechanisms judged to be
significant for climate change. It is therefore recommended that this gas may be
included in JI projects.
5.5.4 Perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride
The perfluorocarbons (PFCs) that will be considered here are perfluoromethane,
perfluoroethane, perfluorocyclobutane and perfluorohexane. These gases, as well as
sulphur hexafluoride, are present in very low concentrations in the atmosphere, but the
levels are rapidly increasing. They are considered important for the radiative balance
and climate due to their strong absorbing properties as well as their extremely long
lifetimes. The lifetimes are 50 000 years for perfluoromethane, 10 000 years for
perfluoroethane and 3 200 years for sulphur hexafluoride. This leads to very high GWP
values for these gases.
Natural sources of PFCs are not known, and the most important source is probably the
aluminum industry. SF  is emitted from the production of magnesium and aluminum6
as well as from secondary foundries and electrical equipment. Although the
contribution from the perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride to the global
enhancement of the greenhouse effect is small, these gases may be important for the
contribution on country levels.  43
5.5.5 Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs)
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) are groups of
 IPCC (1992), and references therein.44
 MtN : Megatons of nitrogen (equal to teragrams of nitrogen (TgN)).45
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gases that exert significant direct radiative effects on climate. In addition, these gases
destroy ozone in the stratosphere. Ozone is an important climate gas and model studies
indicate that depletion of stratospheric ozone has significant effects on climate due to
absorption of solar radiation and absorption and emission of longwave radiation.44
These are factors that complicate calculations of the total effect of CFCs and HCFCs on
climate. Since these gases are covered by the Montreal protocol, which has its own
mechanisms for control, the CFCs and HCFCs need not be covered by the FCCC.
Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) were introduced as substitutes for the CFCs and HCFCs.
They do not destroy stratospheric ozone since they do not contain chlorine. However,
some of the HCFs have strong direct effects on the radiative balance, but, since they do
not affect stratospheric ozone and thus have no known significant indirect effects on
climate, the GWPs may be calculated with reasonable degree of confidence. These gases
may thus be included in JI projects.
5.6 Knowledge of emission sources
The knowledge of the emission sources varies among the different gases. Most sources
of methane are relatively well known, while there are significant limitations to our
understanding of the sources of N O. The emissions of HCFs, on the other hand, are2
well known. The status of the knowledge of the emissions must be taken into account
when JI projects are designed. Furthermore, the accuracy in monitoring or estimating
the amount of gas emitted or taken up, and the possibilities of detecting any effects of
measures, must be considered (see the discussion at the end of this chapter). This lack
of knowledge about the sources may make it difficult to establish the baseline
emissions, which is a prerequisite for JI projects. Thus the effects of measures
implemented to reduce emissions may be difficult to estimate. Since there are large
uncertainties related to the emission numbers of nitrous oxide (N O) special attention2
should be given to this gas. The ranges given by IPCC (1994) for the global emissions
from cultivated soils and biomass burning are 1.8-5.3 and 0.2-1.0 MtN/yr, respectively,
illustrating the uncertainties connected to these sources.  The ranges for industrial45
sources and cattle/feed lots are 0.7-1.8 and 0.2-0.5, respectively. For methane there are
large uncertainties related to emissions from the petroleum industry (5-30 Mt CH /yr),4
coal combustion (1-30 Mt CH /yr), rice paddies (20-100 Mt CH /yr), biomass burning4 4
(20-80 Mt CH /yr), and domestic sewage (15-80 Mt CH /yr).4 4
5.7 Short lived gases that have indirect effects on climate
Extensive research is presently being conducted in order to understand the climatic
impacts of emissions of the short lived gases NOx, NMHC and CO. Emissions of these
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gases may affect the radiative balance and climate through chemical processes in the
atmosphere. This occurs mainly by affecting tropospheric ozone and the cleansing
capacity of the atmosphere and thereby also the levels of the greenhouse gases CH ,4
HCF and HCFC. Furthermore, these gases cause local and regional damages such as
effects on health, corrosion and acid deposition. The uncertainties related to the climatic
impacts of NOx, CO and NMHC are so large that these gases should not be included
in JI projects under the FCCC. The atmospheric lifetimes of these gases are relatively
short (from hours to days for NOx and from days to a few months for CO and NMHC).
Their effects on climate through changes in tropospheric ozone will therefore be
regional. 
5.8 Reporting
In the preparation and reporting of inventories of sources and sinks the IPCC
Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories should be used. The
documentation should be transparent and thorough to allow reproduction of the
estimates. This means that essential assumptions, emission factors, activity data and
other relevant information must be given explicitly. If other methods than the IPCC
method are used such documentation is of particular importance to ensure or assess the
comparability of various estimates. The reduction in emission or increase in uptake that
is obtained from the implementation of a project should be given in metric tons on a full
molecular basis for each gas. An assessment of the uncertainty in the emission numbers
would be useful for the evaluation of the projects. 
The emissions may be given in a common unit (CO  equivalents) by the use of GWPs.2
These estimates may be improved in the future and it is important that all parties use
the most recent GWP values. The values given by the IPCC should be used. Table 5.2
lists the GWP values published by IPCC (1994) for the gases that are prudent to include
in JI projects.
53
Table 5.2 Global Warming Potentials (GWPs) for the gases recommended for JI
projects. 
Gas Chemical Lifetime Global Warming Potential
formula (years) (Time horizons)
20 100 500
 years  years  years
Methane CH 14.5±2.5 62 245 75
a
4
b
Nitrous oxide N O 120 290 320 1802
HFC-23 CHF 250 9200 12100 99003
HFC-32 CH F 6 1800 580 1802 2
HFC-43-10mee C H F 208 3300 1600 5204 2 10
HFC-125 C HF 36 4800 3200 11002 5
HFC-134 CHF CHF 119 3100 1200 3702 2
HFC-134a CH FCF 14 3300 1300 4202 3
HFC-152a C H F 15 460 140 442 4 2
HFC-143 CHF CH F 35 950 290 902 2
HFC-143a CF CH 55 5200 4400 16003 3
HFC-227ea C HF 41 4500 3300 11003 7
HFC-236fa C H F 250 6100 8000 66003 2 6
HFC-245ca C H F 7 1900 610 1903 3 5
Sulphur SF 3200 16500 24900 36500
hexafluoride
6
Perfluoromethane CF 50 000 4100 6300 98004
Perfluoroethane C F 10 000 8200 12500 191002 6
Perfluorocyclobutane c-C F 3200 6000 9100 133004 8
Perfluorohexane C F 3200 4500 6800 99006 14
 The GWP for methane includes both direct and indirect effects.
a
 The lengthening of the chemical lifetime due to the CH /OH feedback is taken into account.
b
4
Source: IPCC (1994)
5.9 The main project categories, emissions of various GHGs, and monitoring
possibilities
 
The most important scheme for reducing GHGs emissions is to reduce combustion of
fossil fuels asociated with production and consumption of goods and services. The
major GHG released from fossil fuel production, transport, distribution and combustion
is carbon dioxide, but also some methane and nitrous oxide are also released. The
principal ways of reducing fossil fuel combustion are: 
 If reforestation projects should be applicable for credits as JI projects would inter alia46
depend on the number of years since the earlier forest disappeared due to logging or other
intervention in the area and the type of intervention. 
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i) fuel switching, 
ii) energy efficiency improvements, 
iii) changing the economic structure, 
iv) output reduction.
 
Category iii) refers to changes in the production (and consumption) structure from
more GHG-intensive to less GHG-intensive activities, whereas category iv) refers to the
relation between the level of production in an economy and the release of GHGs. In
relation to JI projects, categories iii) and iv) are less relevant as long as JI projects are
assumed to be of limited size compared to the national economy. Another category is
sink enhancement, where net anthropogenic release of carbon dioxide is reduced
through carbon fixation in biomass or changes in land use and management practices.
The most common sub-categories are reforestation and afforestation. The distinction
between these sub-categories can be of importance since, according to some definitions
of baseline, reforestation may not be considered an increase in carbon sequestration.46
As earlier discussed in section 4.3, there are further potential problems related to
baseline definition and calculations for carbon sequestration projects. Next, there are
possibilities to change agricultural practices and reduce emissions of carbon dioxide,
methane and nitrous oxide. Finally there is a potential for GHG emissions abatement
through changing industrial technologies. Some abatement options and examples for
this and the other categories are given in Table 5.3. 
The four JI project categories of greatest interest are listed in the table. It should be
noted that project categories 1) and 2) are listed under Type I and II projects in Table 4.1,
whereas categories 3) and 4) are listed under project Type III in the same table. We will
mostly be concerned with fossil fuel saving and carbon sinks enhancement projects,
which have the largest potential in terms of anthropogenic emissions to the atmosphere,
and probably also in terms of cost per unit of emissions abatement.
The most practical way to estimate reduction in carbon dioxide emissions from reduced
fossil fuel combustion in category 1) is to employ consumption data from the relevant
generators, heaters, vehicles or other machinery. The carbon content of various fossil
fuels is well known. Thus the monitoring possibilities will depend on the availability
and quality of consumption data for each fuel type. Estimation of nitrous oxide and
methane emissions is more complicated since the emissions are more technology-
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Table 5.3 JI project categories
JI Project Abatement Examples Greenhouse gases Monitoring
category options possibilities
1) Fossil fuel - Develop - Substitute gas - Carbon dioxide - Consumption
saving: renewables. for coal in a - Nitrous oxide data.
- Fuel - DSM. thermal power - Methane - Site
switching. - Reduce losses plant. observations.
- Energy in energy supply - Replace
efficiency sector.  traditional light
improvements. bulbs with high-
a
b
efficiency CFLs.c
2) Changing - Replace - Replace older - Perfluorocarbons - Site
industrial process aluminum - Sulphur        observations.
technologies. technologies. production hexafluoride
- Modify technologies. - Hydrofluorocarbons
products and
related
technologies.
3) Carbon - Afforestation - Reforestate - Carbon dioxide - Remote
sinks or reforestation. degraded sensing.
enhancement. - Changes in grasslands. - Field
land use and - Increase carbon observations.
management sequestration in
practices. soils.d
4) Changing - Develop new - Develop rice - Carbon dioxide - Field
agricultural crop variants.  variants that - Methane observations.
practices. - Collect and generate less - Nitrous oxide - Remote
combust methane sensing.
methane emissions.
emissions. - Employ methane
from dung and
wastes as energy
source.
Demand Side Management.a
Losses in conversion, transportation, and distribution.b
Compact Fluorescent Lamps.c
One option is application of phosphorus.d
specific, and varies with, among other things, the combustion conditions. Controlling
and verifying emissions will  have to rely on measurements and site inspections.
Employing the relevant emission coefficients for each fuel type and greenhouse gas (e.g.
coal, oil and gas), the total reduction in emissions can be estimated. 
The change in GHG emissions from modifying and replacing industrial technologies in
category 2) can be estimated from technology data and field observations. Emission
 Fischer et al. (1994), however, show that there can also be a significant carbon sequestration47
potential through introduction of deep-rooted grasses in savanna areas.
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reduction is technology-specific and must be controlled from site observations,
engineering data and emission measurements for each technology. The quality of the
verification process will be very much dependent on how attainable site inspections are
and their frequency.
The increase in the relevant type of biomass in category 3) can be calculated based on
species and local ecological conditions. Total carbon fixation can then be estimated from
the carbon content of the specific biomass type. Trees are most important for carbon
sequestration.  Afforestation and changes in land use can be inspected by remote47
sensing (airplanes or satellites) in combination with field observations. From such
observations the change in carbon dioxide fixation can be estimated with the help of
models, although with some inaccuracy. Compared to the earlier project categories
monitoring seems to be more complicated for category 3).
GHG emissions abatement in category 4) can be estimated from model calculations
calibrated on field observations. With respect to changes in agricultural practices and
effect on emissions of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide, remote sensing is also
an option, but it is likely that site observations and estimates will be more important
since emission sources and the relations between agricultural activities and emissions
are more complicated and ambiguous than for project categories 1) and 2).
Consequently, monitoring possibilities are also relatively smaller for project category
4) as compared to categories 1) and 2).
5.10 Conclusions
Based on the discussion in this chapter on the state of knowledge of sources and sinks
of various GHGs, as well as the knowledge of their climate impact, carbon dioxide,
methane, nitrous oxide, perfluorocarbons, sulphur hexafluoride and
hydrofluorocarbons can be included in JI projects and made applicable for credits.
Based on present knowledge and monitoring possibilities, project categories 1) and 2)
listed in Table 5.3 (fossil fuel saving and changing industrial technologies) are less
complicated to include in JI arrangements than project categories 3) and 4) (carbon sinks
enhancement and changing agricultural practices). Thus project categories 1) and 2) are
considered as Type I or II JI projects, as defined in Table 4.1, which, according to the
project categories from Table 5.3, involve relatively few potential problems in
implementation and abatement effect control. However, project categories 3) and 4) are
considered as Type III JI projects, involving further potential implementation,
monitoring and control problems. With this background it is recommended that JI
projects involving project categories 1) and 2) should be given some priority as pilot
projects in the present FCCC phase I (where no countries have legally binding
commitments).
      An example of this would be a Norwegian company employing oil-based heaters in the48
production process. The company is facing new restrictions on emissions of air pollutants. Then the
company makes JI investments in Poland if this is a much cheaper way of reducing emissions than in
its own production process. The government is credited the reduced GHG emissions in Poland, and
transfers some of this benefit to the company by allowing reduced GHG emissions in Poland to count
as fulfilling (part of) its obligations to reduce emissions of air pollutants in Norway.
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6. INVOLVING PRIVATE ENTERPRISES
This chapter considers what type of national framework would best stimulate the
involvement of private enterprises in initiating and financing JI projects.
Similar to other environmental regimes, the rules of FCCC apply, in the first instance,
to the actions of states. However, it is the responsibility of the states to ensure that
Parties under their jurisdiction, frequently private enterprises, comply with the rules
of the regime, also with respect to a future global JI regime. Assuming that a JI
mechanism is operational under the FCCC, an investor government will receive credits
for JI investments undertaken by a private enterprise in a host country. Then the
investor's government must determine criteria for approval of such investment schemes
undertaken by the enterprises, and settle on an 'exchange rate' between such credits and
a change in national regulations affecting the private enterprise.  48
In the present phase I, where no Parties to the FCCC have legally-binding
commitments, some private enterprises have already engaged in offsetting investments,
denoted as OI in Table 6.1. These are investments to reduce GHG emissions in another
country undertaken by a private enterprise at its own cost. The motivation for such
investments can be an expectation of future restrictions on GHGs emissions and
establishment of a credits mechanism. Enterprises in the vanguard of such investments
could make extra profits in future markets and, as discussed below, might earn public
relations benefits related to 'a green image'. The investment in OI can be compared to
other investments undertaken by companies under uncertainty, where an expected
profit must be anticipated.
In phase II with an operational JI mechanism, governments, international organizations
and private enterprises can be involved in various ways in the financing of JI projects.
One option for JI projects is for a government, as part of a bilateral arrangement, to
invest in a JI project which is carried out by the host country's government or one of its
state institutions. In Table 6.1 such JI project settings are named JI . The investorState
government can instead contract a private enterprise in the host country, or private
enterprises in both the investing and host countries, to operate the JI project, denoted
as JI  in the table. Depending on the documented GHGs' abatement effect from theContract
JI project, the investing country should receive emission abatement credits.
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Table 6.1 Different settings for Joint Implementation projects with respect to
financing and operation.
OPERATING
AGENT IN HOST
COUNTRY
The state Private
enterprisesa
FINANCING The state JI JI
AGENT IN
INVESTOR 
COUNTRY
State Contract
Private - JI
enterprises OI
Enterp.
This may also be private enterprises in the investor country.a
The most promising and interesting JI option for private enterprises is JI  in whichEnterp.
private enterprises are induced to finance and carry out JI projects. In this case, private
enterprises finance and operate JI projects in a host country, given incentives
established by the government in the investing country. The private enterprises may
face, or anticipate that they will face, restrictions on emission of pollutants in terms of
taxes or quotas of GHGs. In principle, as long as a linkage between the regulations and
JI investments is established, any other type of government regulation that is costly to
the enterprises can be employed to give private enterprises incentives to undertake JI
projects. The enterprises will have incentives to invest in JI projects as long as the
investment cost is lower than the possible gain of modifying national regulations, for
example through lobbying. The incentives can be in terms of tax credits or increased
domestic quotas of GHGs (or eventually less reduction in domestic emissions required
from the private enterprises).
Anticipation of future regulation is a significant reason why private enterprises might
be interested in investing in JI projects, and there are a number of reasons why
enterprises anticipating regulation might want to be involved in JI projects. Moreover,
private enterprises may even choose to do so before regulation under the FCCC
becomes mandatory. One alternative is for private enterprises to engage in OI. Private
enterprises might want to be involved in JI projects to acquire, maintain, or improve
their image as environmentally responsible companies. Private enterprises are
interested in getting 'eco-labelled' by the government as this improves their 'green
image' and might have a positive impact on consumer behavior and consequently
improve their market position.
Private enterprises may also consider that other aspects are important when making
      William J. Clinton and Albert Gore, Jr., The Climate Change Action Plan (Washington, D.C.:49
October 1993).
      Department of State, 'Availability of Groundrules for U.S. Initiatives on Joint Implementation',50
Federal Register, December 17 1994, vol. 58, no. 241, pp. 66057-66059; Department of State, 'Final
Groundrules', Federal Register, June 1 1994, vol. 59, no. 104, pp. 28442-28446; Costa Rican Office for
Sustainable Development, 'From Rio to Reality: First-of-Its Kind Bilateral Climate Change and
Sustainable Development Accord Signed by U.S. and Costa Rica' (Arlington, VA: September 30, 1994).
      Such a chain of events facilitated the establishment of the global ocean dumping regime.  See51
Ringius (1992), Radwaste Disposal and the Global Ocean Dumping Convention: The Politics of
International Environmental Regimes', Ph.D. diss., the European University Institute, Florence, Italy,
1992.
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decisions about financing JI projects. During an initial phase of voluntary measures and
regulations, private enterprises may acquire useful experiences which they could draw
on when regulation later becomes mandatory. In a situation with no mandatory rules
and regulations, they may gain useful experiences that can help them identifying and
exploring the most effective ways for JI. In a more regulated business environment later,
it might be costly to make mandatory investments in JI. Furthermore, by pointing to
their experiences with JI, enterprises might attempt to influence the way a government
designs rules and regulations for JI. Finally, the private companies with the best JI
performances will probably be the strongest candidates for government investments in
JI.
There are indications that private enterprises may finance JI projects even before
binding rules are agreed to within FCCC, that is in Phase I as discussed in chapter 1.
The Clinton Climate Change plan does not rely on any compulsive measures but, if it
seems justified later, binding regulations will in all likelihood be introduced by the
Clinton administration.  At present, the private sector in the United States seems to be49
anticipating future binding domestic climate change regulations. It should also be noted
that the Clinton administration has established 'groundrules' for JI projects, commonly
known as the United States' initiative on JI (USIJI), and has initiated bilateral
arrangements with developing countries.  In line with this domestic development, the50
United States may at some future point have a considerable interest in getting binding
rules and commitments within the FCCC that can harmonize the costs of regulation
across countries, at least within the group of OECD countries.51
 Article 13 in the Convention reads: 'The Conference of the Parties shall, at its first session,52
consider the establishment of a multilateral consultative process, available to Parties on their request,
for the resolution of questions regarding the implementation of the Convention.'
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7. REPORTING AND VERIFICATION
7.1 Introduction
Most environmental treaties have a poor record of effective implementation control.
The inclusion of effective mechanisms for compliance and implementation control is
often hampered by the reluctance of states to cooperate. Their arguments essentially
reflect opposition to what they perceive as foreign influence over management of their
national resources. 
Relevant experiences from the environmental field show that an international regime's
built-in procedures are important in order to create an efficient implementation control
system. Similar to some other agreements where national measures have transboundary
effects, emphasis should be put on establishing prior notification and consultation
arrangements. Attention should in addition be given to the development of reporting
and fact-finding procedures. At present there are no rules or regulations developed for
implementation control under the FCCC.  However, the COP will in all likelihood52
address this issue in March/April 1995. 
States have recently used various types of non-compliance control procedures in
environmental treaties. Such non-compliance procedures are intended to increase the
implementation of treaty obligations. The most recent example is the 1987 Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, one of the most effective
environmental treaties with regard to verification and control. The implementation
control regime under the Montreal Protocol has a quasi-judicial form and serves as a
party-steered verification and control regime. The Montreal Protocol consists of strong
legally binding substantive and technical standards and an effective verification and
control system supported by a fund. This three-pillar system makes the Montreal
Protocol unique compared to other international environmental regimes. As discussed
in chapter 4, implementation effectiveness might in addition be enhanced through use
of incentive contracts between Parties wishing to engage in JI projects.
7.2 An institutional arrangement
In order to meet some minimum requirements for the COP's authorization of JI
arrangement under the FCCC, it will be essential to keep records of reported JI projects,
to perform some control and verification functions, and to prepare information needed
for the COP to award credits according to agreed criteria. The COP should therefore
create a mechanism assisting it in performing such functions. In this respect, several
organizational alternatives are possible, even if the COP may prefer to be the only
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authoritative body. The experiences with the Montreal Protocol indicate that the Parties
to the FCCC may choose the COP as the authoritative body, while the preparatory work
needed for its decision-making will be entrusted to a specialized organization, perhaps
created for that particular purpose.
The experiences from relevant international environmental agreements, as well as the
complexity of many JI-relevant issues, underscore the need for a specialized JI
secretariat. Such a JI secretariat should be financed by a group of the most committed
countries. This secretariat might report to a special Committee on implementation
under the COP if so decided. Such a Committee, consisting of a limited number of
country Parties elected for a limited time period by the COP, might be of significant
assistance in performing control and verification activities. Depending on the nature of
the institutional arrangement for JI that finally will be created by the COP (see chapter
2 for the possible alternatives) the Committee/JI secretariat might:
- provide information on reported JI activity to all interested parties
as well as the public;
-  coordinate development of a common reporting format;
- examine the validity of the baseline established in JI projects that
is reported by the participating countries;
- coordinate control and verification activities as decided, and report
to the COP; and
-  prepare and recommend credits to be awarded by the COP.
Until legally binding commitments have been agreed upon by the Parties, the
Committee/JI secretariat might be entrusted to initiate pilot projects conducted through
a pilot phase. Such a pilot phase will make it possible to experiment with various ways
in which JI might serve the objective of the FCCC once legal commitments are
introduced.
If given a broader mandate, the Committee/JI secretariat might collect information on
the externalities of JI projects, the local economic and environmental benefits as well as
the costs of projects, their positive or negative impact on the development priorities of
the host country, how projects have affected the local population, and other important
aspects. However, this would imply a larger budget and seems like an unfeasible option
for the near future.  
Yet another alternative might be to establish an independent institution to act as a
Clearinghouse or a Credits Bank for JI projects. Should an extensive use of JI projects
develop under the FCCC, a need for a permanent institution with strong capabilities
and capacity would be needed. This institution could also be entrusted with the
management of a credit system controlling the amount of claimed credits with respect
to countries Parties' implementation obligations and possible GHG emissions
reductions due to JI projects.
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7.3 A reporting and verification regime
It is a reasonable assumption that JI projects will require extensive examination of their
GHG abatement effect and perhaps also their externalities. There will most likely be a
need for control and verification arrangements that are more extensive than is usual for
implementation of Parties' treaty obligations. This requirement must at the same time
be weighed against the need to respect the choice of countries as to how they want to
inform on the management of their natural resources and pursuance of their national
development objectives. A system which takes such concerns into account should be
built on a foundation of mutual trust and concern for cost effectiveness. This could
imply that the implementation control system for JI projects should consist of two main
parts:
- a reporting system by the Parties cooperating in a JI project; and
- a verification system based on a random choice of projects for evaluation.
Reporting
It seems preferable to organize reporting as a three-step process. The first step could be
a 'note of information'. Such a note of information should be made by the Parties
planning a JI project, and be forwarded to the designated JI organization under the
FCCC. It should be publicly available, and might be limited to information on key
elements such as who the participants are, the kind of project planning, the expected
results, where the project is located, and the time schedule. 
A second communication could be an official report by the participants to the COP
made in accordance with an established reporting format. The participating Parties
could, if they so wish, invite any NGO, research institutions or others to participate in
the reporting. To gain sufficient credibility for the mechanism it is necessary that the
reporting requirements are carefully considered. As discussed in chapter 4, reporting
requirements should include inter alia:
a) Provisions for transparency, meaning that any third party should be able to 
reconstruct and verify the information given;
b) Information on the baseline, sufficient to reconstruct and evaluate its validity;
c) Information on arrangements between the participating Parties if an incentive
contract or other agreements have been made;
d) Information on the projected emission savings, how these are calculated and will
be monitored over the lifetime of the project;
e) Information on the externalities of the project; alternatively the benefits/ 
drawbacks of the project might be left to the participating parties to decide; and
f) Broader environmental impact assessments and evaluations of how the projects
fit in with national development priorities. 
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Because JI projects might perform better or worse than expected, a third and final report
could be made on the basis of the completed project where actual emission reductions
are established. The report will give the possibility to award credits only on the basis
of after-the-fact emission reductions. Alternatively, the final report might adjust the
quantity of earlier awarded credits.
Verification
Accurate and relevant information reported by the Parties themselves should be the
primary tool for verification of the GHG abatement effect from JI projects. The main
report must meet some agreed technical standards established by the COP. Adherence
to this reporting format should be a prerequisite for receiving emission credits. A
Committee on implementation should also have the authority to request further
information or clarification from the reporting Parties. Based on an acceptable report,
the Committee/JI secretariat could prepare a recommendation for awarding credits to
the COP. If such procedures are followed, verification practice would normally not be
overly complicated or expensive.
Reporting on JI projects and its GHG abatement effect may be a complicated and
difficult task. The JI mechanism should therefore also have a system for reassessment
of reports, control of data and on-site inspections. Such an extraordinary verification
procedure should be a responsibility entrusted with the Committee, with a
representative number of seats for the different groups of countries.
These extraordinary verification processes should include making on spot checks, and
different categories of JI projects may be randomly chosen at irregular intervals. Such
control or fact-finding missions intended to resolve uncertainty regarding the effects of
JI projects might for example be modelled after the OECD environmental performance
reviews, where experts representing three member countries, the secretariat and
independent experts make a report on another member country.
7.4 Conclusions
* JI projects will require examination and control that is more extensive compared to
what usually is the case in relation to implementation of Parties' treaty obligations. 
* These requirements must be balanced against the need to respect how countries wish
to inform on their management of natural resources as well as how they pursue their
national development objectives.
* Such a system might be found in a combined reporting and verification system based
on mutual confidence.
* In order to achieve a credible system that is acceptable to the Parties, carefully
designed reporting obligations should be developed and agreed upon by the COP.
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* Apart from the reporting of the Parties participating in a JI project, an implementation
control should allow for independent reassessment of reports by a designated body
under the COP. This activity should be conducted as randomly chosen spot checks.
* This designated body should be a Committee on Implementation under the COP. A
JI secretariat should also be established to serve as an information center on JI activity
and assist the Implementation Committee and the COP in the tasks discussed in this
chapter.
* The first COP should make decisions as to the establishment of these bodies. They may
initiate a constructive phase I period during which pilot projects and further discussions
on JI may help all Parties evaluate the possible benefits from JI and the question of how
JI may best serve the objective of the FCCC.
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8. CONCLUSIONS
The motivation for countries participating in JI arrangements is important for the global
effect of the abatement. Our point of departure is that most countries will give first
priority to what they perceive as being their own national interest and less priority to
that of the global benefit. There is a need, therefore, to develop the mechanism of JI to
attend to these national interests. The need for control depends, however, on each
country's motivation for their climate policy. Many of the problems discussed in the
report would be reduced if countries choose their climate policy on the basis of the
climate situation being important for their own welfare.
It seems likely that the Climate Convention will develop through four phases in the
future. The first phase is the present situation, in which no countries have legally
binding commitments. In the second phase Annex II countries have legally binding
commitments, whereas Annex I countries have legally binding commitments in the
third phase. In the fourth phase all countries have legally binding commitments.
Different institutional settings are possible for JI projects. The least complex setting
includes bilateral contracts between an investor country and a host country. Other
options are a Clearinghouse institution and a Credits Bank institution. 
The transaction costs involved in planning and implementing JI projects are smallest for
projects in which only Annex II countries are involved and GHG emissions are abated
through fossil fuel saving or changing industrial technologies. There are additional
problems and higher transaction costs when non-Annex II countries are involved, or if
carbon dioxide is sequestrated through forestation, or GHG emissions reduced through
changing agricultural practices. 
The Parties' incentives to overstate the abatement effect of a JI project in reports to the
COP can be reduced through institutional arrangements such as Clearinghouse or
Credits Bank. This is partly due to establishing some type of market that may reduce
the importance of asymmetric information, and partly due to the resources and know-
how of such institutions.
Leakages, defined as a lower GHG abatement effect from a JI project than anticipated,
can be caused by market effects, strategic behavior, or political decisions. There is a
potential for incentive contracts between parties to a JI project that reduce the risk of
leakages based on after-the-fact control, such as a bonus to be paid to the host country
if the project is successfully completed. The success in terms of national GHG abatement
effect will also depend on the host country's political decisions in the implementation
period. Due to the risk of leakages, JI projects should be evaluated 'project-by-project'
(i.e. 'bottom-up'), if possible supplemented by macroeconomic effects based on model
analysis. 
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Asymmetric information between parties to a JI contract can reduce the potential global
cost saving from JI, since the most cost-effective projects may not be carried out first.
Furthermore, asymmetric information leads to inefficient implementation of some of
the chosen projects. Thus the cost per unit GHG abatement for the investor would not
be minimized. Furthermore, strategic behavior of the host could lead to uncertain
abatement outcome for the investor (and at the global level). The risk of such effects can
be reduced through a Credits Bank institution, and shared among all investors.
Due to uncertainty related to future prices, as well as other conditions, there is an extra
value associated with a flexible GHG abatement strategy, i.e. to have the opportunity
to regret a measure that is taken. This may affect the ranking of different JI project
categories. Thus uncertainty can favor, e.g., fuel switching JI projects, since the
operating cost of these is relatively more important than the investment cost, as
compared to, e.g., energy efficiency improvement projects. It may also favor general
domestic measures compared with inflexible agreements with host countries.
Uncertainty can be reduced through project diversification, where the main idea is to
make the uncertainty of the total portfolio of JI projects as small as possible. There is
also uncertainty related to the size of transaction costs and the existence of no-regrets
projects. If there is some risk that the cheapest JI projects are no-regrets and do not
qualify for credits based on after-the-fact control, there may be a biased selection of
projects where the most cost-effective projects are left out.
Based on the present knowledge of sources and sinks as well as the knowledge of
climatic impact of different greenhouse gases the following gases should be considered
in JI projects: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, perfluorocarbons, sulphur
hexafluoride, and hydrofluorocarbons. Inventories of sources and sinks and
documentation should be transparent and based on the IPCC Guidelines and INC
recommendations.
To involve private enterprises in the financing of joint implementation projects the
government must establish a transfer mechanism for credits from the government to the
private enterprises. Furthermore they must meet national regulations that makes it
profitable to undertake JI projects. The incentives can for example be in terms of tax
credits.
In order to achieve a credible system that is acceptable to the Parties, carefully designed
reporting obligations should be developed and agreed upon by the COP. Apart from
the reporting of the Parties participating in a JI project, an implementation control
should allow for independent assessment of reports by a designated body under the
COP. This activity should be conducted as randomly chosen spot checks. The COP
should therefore establish a Committee on Implementation under the COP. A JI
secretariat should also be established to serve as an information center on JI activity and
assist the Committee on Implementation and the COP.
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iANNEX 1
LISTING OF ANNEX I AND ANNEX II COUNTRIES IN THE CLIMATE
CONVENTION
Annex I
Australia
Austria
Belarusa)
Belgium
Bulgariaa)
Canada
Czechoslovakiaa)
Denmark
European Economic Community
Estoniaa)
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungarya)
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Latviaa)
Lithuaniaa)
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Polanda)
Portugal
Romaniaa)
Russian Federationa)
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
Ukrainea)
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
United States of America
a) Countries that are undergoing the process of transition to a market economy.
ii
Annex II
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
European Economic Community
Finland
France
Germany
 Greece
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
United States of America
